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WHAT DID YOU LEARN IN SCHOOL TODAY?
FREE SPEECH, VALUES INCULCATION,
AND THE DEMOCRATICEDUCATIONAL PARADOX
Martin H. Redisht & Kevin Finnertyt

The intersection of democracy and education gives rise to a troubling
paradox: On the one hand, a viable democratic system requires an educated
electorate, so that its citizens may make informed decisions as they participate
in the process of self-government. On the other hand, an educationalsystem
is an inherently authoritarianinstitution in which agents of the state are
provided a unique opportunity to shape the values of impressionable students. Government, therefore, can effectively mold the minds of its citizens
before they enter the adult world-a strategy commonly employed by governments in totalitariansocieties. The educational system thus gives rise to an
indirect but nevertheless serious threat to the freedom of thought that is so
essential to the successful operation of any democracy. After exploring both
the tensions and intersections of democratic and educational theory, the authors propose their own "anti-indoctrination"model of FirstAmendment doctrine, designed to allow courts to curb the most egregious governmental
erosions offree thought while simultaneously leavingschool systems with substantialdiscretion to control curricularand educational decision making.
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More perhaps than any other people, we Americans have tended to talk and
think or (more precisely) to worry about our values.
-Daniel J. Boorstin 1
INTRODUCTION

The American constitutional democracy is premised, at some fundamental level, on the notion that societal decisions are made with
the consent of the governed. 2 Because in a democratic system, the
people are the real governors, 3 it logically follows that government
may not dictate what individuals may say or believe. Although government may seek to influence the outcome of socio-political debates by
contributing to them, the First Amendment right of free expression
prevents government from selectively censoring private communication simply because it disagrees with the views being expressed. 4 Few
I

DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, Self-Liquidating Ideals, in THE DANIEL J. BOORSTIN READER

743, 743 (Ruth F. Boorstin ed., 1995).
2 See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 53-55 (Harvey C. Mansfield &
Delba Winthrop eds. and trans., University of Chicago Press 2000) (1835); DAVID EASTON,
THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 222 (1953)

(defining democracy as "a political system in which

power is so distributed that control over the authoritative allocation of values lies in the
hands of the mass of the people").
3

See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 9 (1965)

("If men are to be gov-

erned, we say, then that governing must be done, not by others, but by themselves.").
4 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) ("If there is a bedrock principle
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.").
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would dispute such essential premises of the American governmental
structure. Yet if one were to consider the operation of the nation's
educational system,, one would see a far different picture.
Most weekday mornings, millions of parents willingly send their
children to the governmentally operated facility known as the public
school. Once there, children are expected to follow a series of rules
designed to facilitate the process by which governmental employees
-teachers-lecture them on subjects deemed important by government officials. To a certain age, children are required by law to receive this governmentally prescribed education, during which time
they are taught what government officials have deemed to be the
truth about those subjects. 5 Moreover, they are instilled-both within
and beyond the formal contours of the curriculum-with certain substantive values deemed by government to be morally fundamental and
certain facts deemed to be indisputable: That the United States is the
greatest nation on earth, for example; that all humans are created
equal; that George Washington and Abraham Lincoln were true
American heroes; and a variety of other empirical or normative
precepts that have been so ingrained in Americans that one hardly
notices them. Further, when tested to see if they are absorbing what is
being taught, students who do not provide the "right" answers will
have their grades suffer accordingly. In the public school context,
then, agents of the government play a far more dominating and censoring role in the thought development process than government is
permitted to play within the broader confines of a democratic society.
The greatest irony in this dramatic dichotomy between a citizen's
role in the educational context and her role in the adult world is that
a vibrant educational process has long been deemed essential to the
effective operation of a democratic system. 6 Democracy trusts citizens
to make wise governing choices; unless those citizens are able to make
Every state requires some sort of education of every child. See MARTHA M. MCCAR(4th ed. 1998) (noting
that every single state's constitution addresses the state legislature's responsibility to provide for a public school system). States may not require parents to send their children to
public schools, however. See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925). Moreover, in recent years more and more parents have elected to homeschool their children,
though the number of such students remains small compared to the number of students
who receive their education in the public school system. See Patricia M. Lines, Home
Schooling, ERIC Digest 381849, available at http://www.ed.gov/databases/ERIC-Digests/
ed381849.html (Apr. 1995) (stating that approximately 1% of the total school-aged population is homeschooled).
6
See R. FREEMAN BUrrs, THE CIVIC MISSION IN EDUCATIONAL REFORM 64-76 (1989)
(noting that Thomas Jefferson considered public education to be essential for the new
democracy); see also BENJAMIN R. BARBER, AN ARISTOCRACY OF EVERYONE: THE POLITICS OF
EDUCATION AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICA 15 (1992) ("There is only one road to democracy:
education. And in democracy, there is only one essential task for the educator: teaching
liberty.").
5

THY ET AL., PUBLIC SCHOOL LAw: TEACHERS' AND STUDENTS' RIGHTS 2
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informed decisions, democracy could lead to a society's demise. The
free-thinking individuals presupposed by a commitment to democracy
cannot be expected to choose soundly without at least a basic education that provides some level of information and training in rational
thought processes. 7 Thus, it is not surprising that American society
has long been committed to the concept of compulsory education and
8
the provision of public schools for educational purposes.
Yet the educational process that serves as a vital catalyst for the
vibrant functioning of American democracy is itself inherently and intentionally undemocratic. Officials of the state determine what subjects are taught, what books are read, and, most importantly, what is
communicated about each subject to a captive audience of largely unformed and impressionable minds. Agents of the state-whether they
be government bureaucrats, school principals, or the individual teachers-determine, for example, whether students will be taught that Columbus was a hero or that he was a genocidal murderer, how
Huckleberry Finn's moral dilemma about the conflict between property rights and human dignity should have been resolved, and
whether the United States treated Native Americans fairly in the
course of the nation's western expansion. State officials will determine whether the New Deal will be presented as a legitimate political
and economic advance, whether women have been mistreated
throughout American history, whether the House Un-American Activities Committee functioned as an effective protector of American society against the threat of external communism, and whether students
will be required to read the works of Toni Morrison instead of those
of Ernest Hemingway. The list of informational and normative choices
that a school system will make during a student's approximately thirteen years within its bounds is virtually endless. Moreover, teachers
often do not present the informational and normative content as being merely one of a number of conceivable alternative views of an
issue or question. Rather, the authoritarian figure in the classroom
will usually determine which viewpoint is "correct," and students may
be expected to provide those "correct" answers on tests, at the risk of
failing if they do not.
It is naive to believe that the content of students' education will
have little or no effect on the perspectives those students will bring to
their choices as citizens within the democratic framework. 9 When we
7 See infra Part I.A.
8 See Burrs, supra note 6, at 64-76.
9 The "history wars" of the mid-1990s illustrate just how much individuals believe that
the content of students' education matters. After Congress agreed to support the first
President Bush's plan for national education goals, which included periodic competency
testing of all students in public schools in subjects such as English, mathematics, science,
history, and geography, a task force sought to develop national history standards. See GARY
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synthesize these two facts, then, one is left with the inevitable conclu-

sion that the attitudes and preconceptions of supposedly free-thinking
and autonomous citizens in American democratic society are shaped
predominantly by the government. This picture seems disturbingly
reminiscent of classic totalitarian societies, which have traditionally
viewed the classroom as the primary means for imposing the type of
thought control so essential to their continued success.' 0 It most assuredly appears inconsistent with liberal democratic theory, the existence of which depends on the capability of autonomous and freethinking individuals to make free choices."' Yet if, as liberal democratic theory assumes, democracy requires widespread education of
the electorate in order to function properly,' 2 one is left with a seemingly intractable paradox: the very process that is essential to the success of democracy threatens the fundamental preconditions of
democracy. Although scholars have occasionally recognized certain

aspects of this dilemma,13 none has proposed a satisfactory resolution.' 4 More importantly, the courts have not acknowledged, much
less resolved, the existence of this fundamental theoretical paradox.
It is our view that recognition of this democratic-educational paradox has important implications for the theory and application of the
First Amendment right of free expression. We believe that the manner in which the inherent structure of the public educational process
B. NAsI-I ET AL., HISTORY ON TRIAL: CULTURE WARS AND THE TEACHING OF THE PAST 150-87
(1997) (describing the heated debate over formulating national history standards). The
National History Standards were assailed just as they were about to be published in the fall
of 1994 as a "product of a misguided effort or a widespread conspiracy." Id. at 188. For the
next year and a half, the standards underwent intense scrutiny because of what standard
makers included and excluded in their attempt to rewrite history under the guise of political correctness. See id. at 188-258.
10
See infra text accompanying notes 47-50.
11

See DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY 115 (2d ed. 1996) ("Liberty of thought,

discussion and action are necessary conditions for the development of independence of
mind and autonomous judgment; they are vital for the formation of human reason or
rationality.").
12

See Amy GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 41-47 (1987); see also Edwards v. Aguil-

lard, 482 U.S. 578, 584 (1987) (stating that public schools are "'symbol[s] of our democracy and the most pervasive means for promoting our common destiny"' (quoting Illinois
ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 231 (1948))); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S.
68, 76 (1979) (noting that public schools transmit "the values on which our society rests").
13
See, e.g.,
BARBER, supra note 6, at 250 ("Education is the exercise of authority (legitimate coercion) in the name of freedom: the empowerment and liberation of the pupil.");
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 104 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett Pub. Co. 1978)
(1859) ("Is it not almost a self-evident axiom that the State should require and compel the
education, up to a certain standard, of every human being who is born its citizen? Yet who
is there that is not afraid to recognize and assert this truth?"); Nel Noddings, Renewing
Democracy in Schools, 80 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 579, 580 (1999) (stating that although education
was always a focus of totalitarian regimes, many liberal democratic thinkers have avoided
systematic education because it "seems to require coercion, and coercion is incompatible
with the liberal/democratic spirit").
14 See infra Parts IIl.A-B.
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threatens First Amendment rights, however, is somewhat more complex than it might first appear. We are not suggesting that the state's
curricular choices directly infringe upon the free speech rights of either teachers or students. Although it is true that students do not
leave their First Amendment rights at the schoolhouse door,' 5 within
the classroom students do not have a constitutional right to say anything they want whenever they want. 16 Nor do teachers have a First
Amendment right to teach whatever they choose. Although a
teacher's First Amendment right allows him to say what he wishes
outside the classroom, 17 the inmates do not run the asylum. If a
school board or principal decides that a particular subject is to be
taught in a particular way, individual teachers do not have a constitutional right in the classroom to preempt the decisions of their superiors.' 8 The First Amendment problem, rather, is more subtle and

indirect, but no less troubling, than the traditionally recognized direct
interferences with a private citizen's attempts to communicate to willing listeners. That problem is, simply, that by means of the public
educational process, the state is able to engage in a dangerous form of
political, social, or moral thought control that potentially interferes
with a citizen's subsequent exercise of individual autonomy.
Such thought control threatens the democratic values embodied
in the First Amendment right of free expression in two fundamental
ways. First, the notion of thought control is inconsistent with the concepts of free thought and mental autonomy that render the exercise
of the free expression right meaningful. To make the point by means
of an admittedly hyperbolic illustration, the rights of freedom of
thought and freedom of expression are useless to a society of mental
automatons. If the American public educational system produces citizens whose minds have been consciously molded in a particular manner, the exercise of free expression by those citizens cannot really be
free in any meaningful sense of the term. Second, by selectively instilling in students a predetermined set of normative values and empirical assumptions, the state effectively favors certain viewpoints over
others. Moreover, given the first concern, this viewpoint selectivity
15 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
16 See Bethel Sch. Dist. v, Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) ("The determination of
what manner of speech in the classroom or in school assembly is inappropriate properly
rests with the school board.").
17
See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (holding that a teacher
cannot be "compelled to relinquish the First Amendment rights [she] would otherwise
enjoy as [a] citizen[ ] to comment on matters of public interest"). But see infra Part IV.C
(discussing the potential limits of a teacher's free speech rights outside the classroom).
18 See, e.g., Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 910 F.2d 1172, 1176 (3d Cir. 1990)
("[N]o court has found that teachers' First Amendment rights extend to choosing their
own curriculum or classroom management techniques in contravention of school policy or
dictates."),
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may have a significant impact well beyond the four walls of the schoolhouse, shaping students' attitudes and predispositions for much of
their adult lives. In this manner, similar to totalitarian societies, the
American government may substantially distort the flow of both political argumentation and political decision making throughout society.
Not all political theorists or constitutional scholars share our concern about the threat to democracy posed by the inherently authoritarian nature of the educational process. Communitarian scholars
would no doubt argue that even a democratic society must have some
means by which to instill in its citizens shared values and traditions, 19
lest the society degenerate into a Hobbesian state of nature, plagued
by a war of all against all. Because of its universal nature and the
formless state in which students enter the process, the education system provides an ideal mechanism for the inculcation of these shared
values. Moreover, communitarians would argue, because of its inherent limitations the educational system does not threaten the individual's ability to speak or think freely once she becomes an adult
member of society. 20 This rationalization of the democratic-educational paradox is a legitimate attempt to reconcile its seemingly conflicting yet interdependent elements. Indeed, even those theorists
who generally resist the sweeping claims of communitarians may find
acceptable a limited notion of shared values, which government may
properly convey to its citizens if it concerns only the value of the democratic process itself.2 1 Nevertheless, the communitarian rationale
fails to satisfactorily address the First Amendment concerns we have
noted.
If one rejects the communitarian rationale, however, two significant problems arise. First, as a theoretical matter, it is not clear how
to restrict the educational process. Second, even if all agreed upon
the underlying theory driving constitutional analysis, as a purely practical matter it is uncertain how the judiciary could effectively police
the day-to-day educational process to enforce the agreed upon theoretical structure, at least without turning into a type of super-school
board. After all, schools have to teach something. It would be nearly
impossible for a reviewing court to distill the unacceptable from the
essential without effectively dictating the content of the curriculum,
which surely is an untenable result. We believe, however, that acceptable, if perhaps not ideal, answers exist to both questions.
19 For a more detailed discussion of this communitarian approach, see infra Part II.B.
20 Many communitarian theorists would no doubt advocate strict limitations on even
an adult's ability to undermine values claimed to be shared throughout American society.
See infra Part Il.B.
21 See ROBERT A. DAHL, ON DEMOCRACY 157 (1998) (arguing that a democracy is most
stable when its democratic "beliefs and predispositions are embedded in the country's culture and are transmitted, in large part, from one generation to the next").
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It would be both practically and theoretically impossible to completely prevent the governmental values inculcation that occurs in the
educational process; in certain instances, values inculcation is an inherent by-product of the educational process, and it would be absurd
to hypothesize a vibrant democratic society absent such a process. 22
However, it is possible, through use of what we call the "anti-indoctrination" model of First Amendment interpretation, for the judiciary to
reasonably police the educational process in order to restrict values
inculcation to that essential minimum degree required for the educa23
tional process to function.
In policing government's ability to inculcate values through the
educational process, the anti-indoctrination model gives significant,
albeit not dispositive, weight to the distinction between what is taught
in the curriculum and what is conveyed to students in a context unattached to the formal process of course instruction. 24 It will be difficult
22
And once one acknowledges this point, one must acknowledge that along with information, schools will inevitably teach values, even if they make a conscious effort to minimize predisposing students to particular viewpoints. See BARBARA B. GADDY ET AL., SCHOOL
WARS: RESOLVING OUR CONFLICTS OVER RELIGION AND VALUES 207 (1996) ("[P]articipants
on all sides of the debate, as well as courts and legal scholars, agree that a 'valueless' education is not possible.").
23
See infra Part III.E (describing the anti-indoctrination model).
24 Despite frequent reference to it in its opinions, the Supreme Court has never defined the boundaries of a school's curriculum. See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S.
675, 683 (1986) ("The process of educating our youth for citizenship in public schools is
not confined to books, the curriculum, and the civics class ....
); Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457
U.S. 853, 869 (1982) (plurality opinion) ("Petitioners might well defend their claim of
absolute discretion in matters of curriculum by reliance upon their duty to inculcate community values." (emphasis in original)). In Boring v. Buncombe County Board of Education,
the Fourth Circuit turned to Webster's for a definition. 136 F.3d 364, 367 (4th Cir. 1998)
(en banc). It was defined broadly enough to include "all planned school activities," thus

including plays, sports, and clubs. Id. at 367-68 (quoting WEBSTER'S

THIRD NEW INTERNA-

DICTIONARY 557 (1971)). The court also relied on the Supreme Court's analysis in
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, in which a school newspaper prepared by students
under the direction of a teacher in their journalism class was deemed to be part of the
curriculum because it was "supervised by faculty members and designed to impart particular knowledge or skills to student participants and audiences." Id. at 368 (citing 484 U.S.
260, 271 (1988)). On the other hand, in Pico the Court had previously distinguished the
school library from the curriculum, finding the library to be a place of "voluntary inquiry."
457 U.S. at 869 (plurality opinion). One scholar has suggested that as a normative matter,
the Supreme Court has treated the curriculum as being a thing that is academically related. SeeJames E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Public Schools, 86 Va. L. Rev. 1335, 1340-41
(2000). If this is so, the activities involved in both Kuhlmeier and Boring could be classified
as curricular inasmuch as both cases involved activities that flowed directly from an academic setting. In both cases, the activities were extensions of an academic class, rather
than separate, after-school journalistic or dramatic activities. For the moment at least, we
accept Ryan's interpretation that the curriculum relates to academic rather than social
education, though we will return to this definitional question later to see if it presents
problems. Ryan defines "curricular activities" as those concerning the "conveying of information or the teaching of academic or vocational skills to students by faculty members."
Id. at 1340 n.17. Because they focus on the curriculum from an educational rather than
legal perspective, educational theorists tend to be even less clear than the law in providing
TIONAL
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to police those values conveyed to students during the process of educating them about specific class subjects. In most cases, one cannot
reasonably expect the courts to play a significant role in checking governmental attempts to shape student value systems incidental to the
teaching of subjects that are not themselves directly designed to inculcate values.
On the other hand, pursuant to the anti-indoctrination model,
courts will generally deem unconstitutional efforts to shape student
socio-political values outside this education-incidental context. Thus,
courts will determine that special assemblies or programs held for the
purpose of value inculcation-whether about racial or gender equality, ethnic tolerance, patriotism or any other normative issue of concern primarily beyond the four walls of the schoolhouse-are
presumptively unconstitutional, because they are improper governmental attempts to inculcate socio-political values in a uniquely impressionable audience. This would be even more true of any pledges
or oaths, such as the Pledge of Allegiance, that students must memorize and repeat aloud during the school day. 25
Even within the contours of the curriculum, the anti-indoctrination model demands that teachers convey only those values that are
both substantially related and incidental to the educational process.
In other words, teachers must teach something other than the particular value itself. To the extent that the school could discuss issues of
ideological, moral, or social values in a free-standing context within
the classroom, it would also have to explore competing values. 26
At first blush, this standard might seem extremely difficu't to apply. However, in many ways the judicial inquiry would differ little
from the inquiry into the content of the educational process in First
Amendment Establishment Clause cases. The Supreme Court has
construed the Establishment Clause to allow public schools to teach
about religion without teaching religion itself.27 The inquiry under
a useful definition. See Gerald Marker & Howard Mehlinger, Social Studies, in HANDBOOK
OF RESEARCH ON CURRICULUM 830, 841 (Philip W. Jackson ed., 1992) ("Regardless of the

best efforts of national commissions, state departments of education, and textbook authors, the formal curriculum is what each teacher decides what it will be."); Daniel Pekarsky, Guiding Visions and Educational Planning, in CURRICULUM & CONSEQUENCES

15, 15

(Barry M. Franklin ed., 2000) (quoting Herbert M. Kliebard, who noted that John Dewey
did not believe in stating what the curriculum was because he did not have "objectives" for
education).
25 Although we argue that the rote activity that is the Pledge of Allegiance is unconstitutional, we believe that those who find such a thought incredulous may take comfort in
Justice Brennan's words from the opinion in a flag-burning case: "Our decision is a reaffirmation of the principles of freedom and inclusiveness that the flag best reflects ....
"
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 419 (1989) (upholding the defendant's right to burn the
American flag).
26 See discussion infra Part III.C.
27 See, e.g., Sch. Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224-25 (1963).
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the anti-indoctrination model would focus on whether the context indicates that schools are describing or advocating. As we will demonstrate, adoption of this model could reduce the harms to First
Amendment interests that flow from orchestrated governmental values inculcation in the public schools without significantly disrupting
the day-to-day operation of the educational process.
Many, no doubt, would be perturbed by the notion that public
schools are constitutionally disabled from conveying values that the
community deems sacrosanct-for example, that the use of alcohol
and tobacco by teenagers is wrong, that all races are equal, and that
people should not be discriminated against because of gender or sexual preference. It is important to keep in mind, however, that First
Amendment choices are necessarily made behind a Rawlsian "veil of
ignorance": when choosing a mode of First Amendment construction,
one cannot know which particular values will be promoted as a result.2 8 If one concludes that the First Amendment permits schools to
consciously seek to inculcate predetermined values in their students,
that conclusion may not be conditioned on the assumption that only
one particular set of values will be transmitted. Therefore it would be
futile to adopt the abdication approach-an approach that requires
the judiciary to abstain from hearing First Amendment challenges to
curricular decisions 29-in a strategic attempt to advance a particular
set of values. Instead, the socio-political views that the abdication approach strategically advances would be the particular set of socio-political views that are dominant in the community at that particular point
in time. Thus, if one were to suggest that schools must be allowed to
teach that gender or sexual-preference discrimination is bad, those
schools would also have to be allowed to teach that gender or sexualpreference discrimination is good.
Before one may understand the premises and implications of our
anti-indoctrination model, however, one must fully comprehend
where that model is designed to fit within the theoretical and doctrinal topography concerning the First Amendment's application to the
educational process. The initial question concerns the nature of the
First Amendment's application to a school system's curricular choices.
As already noted, the First Amendment implications for school curricular choices are not standard free-speech fare, because curricular
choices do not interfere directly with anyone's legitimate right to
speak. Hence Part I of this Article focuses on the serious, albeit perhaps not immediately recognizable, First Amendment problems that
flow from these choices.
28

SeeJOHN RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-38 (1971).

29

See infta Part III.B.

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88:62

Understanding how the shaping of school curricula for purposes
of values inculcation negatively affects First Amendment interests,
however, answers only the most basic questions. Although that analysis demonstrates that a potential First Amendment problem exists, it
does not explain whether that potential problem actually rises to the
level of a constitutional violation, and if so, what the judicial remedy
should be. To answer these questions, a much more foundational
type of theoretical analysis is required, which scholars have yet to employ effectively. Although a certain amount of both case law and
scholarship exist concerning the constitutional-educational intersection, 30 their analyses generally have been unduly truncated: neither
courts nor First Amendment scholars have provided a detailed exploration of the broad theoretical intersection between educational theory and the democratic process. Moreover, modern educational
theorists have given only limited attention to the issues raised by the
democratic-educational intersection. 3 1 Absent such a first-level theoretical analysis, it is effectively impossible to provide a coherent conception of either the paradoxical "love-hate" nature of the
relationship between educational and democratic theory, or the role
that the First Amendment should play in curbing governmental authority to shape the educational structure. Therefore, in Part II of this
Article we seek to provide that preliminary, but nevertheless essential,
first-level analysis. Prefatory to a detailed First Amendment analysis,
Part II examines how theories of education interact with alternative
visions of American political theory.
Following that preliminary inquiry, Part III explores alternative
First Amendment approaches to the democratic-educational paradox.
It concludes that no approach other than our anti-indoctrination
model adequately balances the relevant First Amendment interests
with competing interests in structuring the modern educational process. Finally, Part IV considers several specific hypothetical First
Amendment problems growing out of the democratic-educational intersection, including schools' authority to refuse to hire teachers because of their ideological affiliations and to teach values as a distinct
subject within the framework of the curriculum.

30
See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Bd. of Educ. v.
Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982); Robert D. Kamenshine, The First Amendment's Implied Political
Establishment Clause, 67 CAL. L. REv. 1104 (1979); Mark G. Yudof, Library Book Selection and
the Public Schools: The Quest for the Archimedean Point, 59 IND. L.J. 527 (1984).
31

See, e.g., Benjamin R. Barber, America Skips School, HARPER'S MAC., Nov. 1993, at 39,

44 (arguing that American society has been "nominally democratic" for such a long time
that Americans take democracy for granted, and that education is needed to turn "young,
selfish individuals" into "conscientious community-minded citizens").
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I
THE FIRST AMENDMENT, EDUCATION, AND INDOCTRINATION

A.

The First Amendment Baseline

Scholars and jurists have never achieved anything approaching
unanimity on either the values served by the First Amendment guarantee of free expression or the doctrinal principles necessary to implement those values. 32 Nevertheless, we believe it is possible to discern
certain baseline precepts that are essential to ensure that the First
Amendment right is not rendered incoherent. Recognition of those
fundamental dictates will provide a solid frame of reference by which
one should measure the constitutional implications of governmental
control of the public education system.
Alexander Meiklejohn once wrote that the precept of free expression "springs from the necessities of the program of self-government.... It is a deduction from the basic American agreement that
public issues shall be decided by universal suffrage." 33 The United
States's commitment to the concept of accountable and representative
government dictates that ultimately, if only indirectly, the people are
responsible for making basic choices of social and moral policy. A
democratic society is not constrained by externally derived or imposed
normative principles; rather, as a definitional matter, a democracy
may select its own substantive value system, 34 either through a
32 Some scholars have stated that free speech "springs from the necessities" of selfgovernment so that the audience is the focus, and what is important is that "everything
worth saying shall be said." See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 3, at 26-27. Others focus on individual liberty, arguing that the development of individual self-realization and self-determination is the key value of free speech. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the FirstAmendment
Freedom of Speech, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 964, 990-1009 (1978). Others, including one of us,
have linked the instrumental and intrinsic values that the First Amendment is designed to
foster. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PX. L. REv. 591 (1982).
Some would only protect explicitly political speech, see, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 20-28 (1971), while others deem that
a basic value of the First Amendment rests in its ability to check the government, see, e.g.,
Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521,
529-44. Still others have urged that the First Amendment's ability to promote tolerance in
society is its greatest attribute. See, e.g., LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA 104-44 (1986). Finally, some scholars

find free expression is beneficial for a combination of reasons. See, e.g., Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 878-86 (1963).
33
MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 3, at 27.
34 See BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY 117-37 (1984) (describing strong democracy as a democracy of amateurs in which individuals are united by their civic education so as to transform rather than accommodate or minimize conflict); HELD, supra note
11, at 173 (describing democratic elitism, under which individuals vote to elect leaders,
then get out of the way of those leaders); Martin H. Redish & Gary Lippman, Freedom of
Expression and the Civic Republican Revival in Constitutional Theory: The Ominous Implications,
79 CAL. L. REV. 267, 267-68 (1991) (describing civic republicanism's core concepts of the
elevation of the common good over individual interests and the process of deliberation);
supra note 1 and accompanying text; see also HELD, supra note 11, at ] ("[N]early everyone
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majoritarian representative process or, if the society has chosen to enshrine certain values in a supermajoritarian constitution, through a
supermajoritarian amendment process. 35 This commitment to political freedom, in turn, necessarily presumes the existence of an electorate made up of free-willed individuals who are capable of making
their own choices. Because the individual members of a free society
bear this ultimate power and responsibility, it follows that they must
be permitted to communicate information and ideas to each other in
a free and open manner in order to facilitate democratic decision
making. Moreover, because externally derived values cannot constrain a democratic society, the electorate has unlimited ability to
adopt any value structure it wishes through its chosen representatives
or by constitutional amendment.
Although this conclusion may appear extreme, any other conclusion would render a democracy effectively indistinguishable from any
totalitarian society that requires elections to reach a predetermined
result. Because a democratic society theoretically may, through its
governing agents, choose any course of action, and because the freedom of expression is designed to facilitate the democratic process, it
follows that in regulating private speech, government must be constrained by what can be called a principle of "epistemological
humility. ' 36 Under the First Amendment, the Supreme Court has

said, there is "no such thing as a false idea." 37 Were those in power
able to selectively restrict private expression on the basis of the government's normative view of the positions expressed, the entire governing process would be seriously distorted and society's initial
commitment to democracy threatened.38 By distorting the free flow
of information and opinion to favor one viewpoint or to burden another, government would interfere with the exercise of the electorate's ultimate self-governing function.3 9 Thus, the Supreme Court
has adopted as its doctrinal baseline the principle that the govern-

today professes to be a democrat. Political regimes of all kinds throughout the world describe themselves as democracies.").
35 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. V (providing for a supermajoritarian process of
amendment).
36 For a detailed discussion of the concept of epistemological humility, see MARTIN H.
REDISH, MONEY TALKS: SPEECH, ECONOMIC POWER, AND THE VALUES OF DEMOCRACY 6-7, 28

(2001).
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974).
See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 189, 198 (1983).
39
See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 3, at 26-27 ("[T]he reason for.., equality of status in
the field of ideas lies deep in the very foundations of the self-governing process.").
37
38
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ment may not constitutionally regulate private expression because it
40
disagrees with the viewpoints expressed.
Although the prohibition on viewpoint-based regulation provides
the foundation of modern First Amendment theory and doctrine, the
Supreme Court has recognized certain ancillary precepts that do not
concern direct restrictions on private expression but which nevertheless are essential to ensure a viable First Amendment right. For example, the Court has held that government may not compel private
individuals or entities to speak, even though such compulsion does
not necessarily prohibit a private party from saying anything she
wishes. 4 1 The Court reached this conclusion because compelled expression breaches the barrier between government and private individuals and threatens to skew the political marketplace to further
42
governmental goals and interests.
Moreover, the individual's freedom of thought must be constitutionally protected, even though as a technical matter freedom of
thought is not the same as freedom of expression. Freedom of
thought must be protected, because absent free thought the concept
of free expression is rendered incoherent: the right to speak freely is
meaningless if the speaker has not been permitted to freely formulate
her thoughts prior to speaking. 43 Indeed, a foundational strategy of
any sophisticated totalitarian society is to control the minds of its citizens, thereby destroying individual mental autonomy. 44 Not surpris40
See supra note 4 and accompanying text; see also Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408
U.S. 92, 95 (1972) ("[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that government has no
power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its
content.").
4'
See, e.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 11 (1986)
(plurality opinion) ("'The essential thrust of the First Amendment is to prohibit improper
restraints on the voluntary public expression of ideas.... There is necessarily ... a concomitant freedom not to speak publicly, one which serves the same ultimate end as freedom of speech in its affirmative aspect.' "(quoting Estate of Hemingway v. Random House,
Inc., 244 N.E.2d 250, 255 (N.Y. 1968))); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977)
(holding that the "right of freedom of thought protected by the First Amendment ...
includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all"); W.
Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) ("If there is any fixed star in
our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall
be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens
to confess by word or act their faith therein.").
42
See Maynard, 430 U.S. at 714-15.
43
See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234-35 (1977) ("[Alt the heart of
the First Amendment is the notion that an individual should be free to believe as he will,
and that in a free society one's beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his conscience
rather than coerced by the State.").
44
See Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 311-14 (1958); Martin H. Redish & Kirk J. Kaludis, The Right of Expressive Access in First Amendment Theory: Redistributive
Values and the DemocraticDilemma, 93 Nw. U. L. REv. 1083, 1115 (1999) ("Totalitarian states
are distinguished from earlier autocratic regimes in their goal of complete subjugation of
individual personality."); see also CARLJ. FRIEDRICH & ZBICNIEW K. BRZEZINSKI, TOTALITARIAN

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88:62

ingly, then, such thought control is anathema to any democratic
society. It is therefore difficult to imagine that the Supreme Court
would uphold against a First Amendment challenge governmentally
compelled "re-education" classes designed to indoctrinate citizens in a
particular political philosophy. Although as a technical matter these
courses would not directly interfere with the citizens' right to express
themselves, much like compelled speech these classes would breach
the wall between government and the mental autonomy of the individual citizen. Thus, governmentally forced listening or reading must
be presumed to violate the First Amendment in much the same way
that governmentally forced speech does.
B.

Applying the First Amendment Baseline to the Public School
Setting

Although we believe few commentators or jurists would significantly disagree with our analysis of the First Amendment's theoretical
and doctrinal baselines, if one were to apply these baselines to the
context of public schools, one would immediately recognize significant discord between these recognized rights and the government's
established practice. Like citizen indoctrination courses, public
schools compel students to attend governmentally orchestrated educational operations, where they will have their minds shaped and informed in the manner that some agent of government has deemed
appropriate. 45 Of course, it would be nonsensical to suggest that the
First Amendment implications of compulsory education for children
are the same as the implications of compulsory education for adults.
No one could dispute that compulsory education for children is justified by a compelling interest inapplicable to the use of this process for
adults-the vital need to create an informed and educated citizenry in
a democratic society, in which the citizens act as the ultimate
46
governors.
Nonetheless, a number of aspects of the American educational
system threaten core premises of democracy. The educational process's potentially ominous implications for a democratic society can be
seen by examining how totalitarian societies have employed their educational systems as a strategic means for inducing citizen compliance.
DICTATORSHIP AND AUTOCRACY 129-60 (2d ed. 1965) (describing the effect of propaganda
in the media and in schools on the citizens of totalitarian governments).
45 In the case of public schools, that agent of government would be the state or the
school board. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
46 See GUTMANN, supra note 12, at 275 (noting that although government mandates
schooling for children so that they might be literate and capable of exercising their "rights
and responsibilities of democratic citizenship," government does not mandate that functionally illiterate adults continue with their schooling until they meet some minimal standard of literacy).
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For example, Communist societies viewed the educational system as
the primary means for bringing about such compliance. Although
adult citizens were already formed individuals, children were a "blank
page" upon which the state could write, 47 because they represented
48
the most "malleable minds" among the citizenry.
Shortly after gaining control of China in 1949, the Communist
regime "banned all texts then in use." 49 In East Germany, during the
Cold War, the Ministry of Education oversaw the curriculum and
teachers' lesson plans, and ensured that texts were uniform throughout the country. 50 In Romania, teachers expressed discomfort about
being compelled to lie to their students when teaching history after
the Communist revolution in that country. 51 In the Soviet Union,
when children began kindergarten, rather than teach that school was
an extension of home life, teachers sought to portray the children's
home life as an extension of kindergarten. 5 2 Totalitarian nations developed similar educational practices designed to indoctrinate stu53
dents. These practices included centralizing control of education,
emphasizing political tasks over educational ones 5 4 singing revolutionary songs, 55 memorizing Party slogans 5 6 putting children to work
at an early age so they became accustomed to having labor as part of
their daily lives, 57 holding ceremonies to honor the revolutionary
cause, 58 imparting communist ideology in all academic subjects, 5 9 and
60
subordinating the individual to the welfare of the greater group.
See LISA A. KIRSCHENBAUM, SMALL COMRADES: REVOLUTIONIZING CHILDHOOD IN SORUSSIA, 1917-1932, at 105 (2001) (describing the Communist view of children in
Russia).
48
See FRANKLIN W. HOUN, To CHANGE A NATION: PROPAGANDA AND INDOCTRINATION IN
47

VIET

10-12 (1961) (describing the Communist view of children in China).
Id. at 74.
50
See Margrete Siebert Klein, A Study in Contemporary Communist Education: Natural Science in the Ten-Year General Polytechnical Secondary School of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) 22 (1978) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern
University) (on file with Northwestern University Library).
51
See Martin Joseph Patrick Croghan, Ideological Training in the Romanian School
System 59 (1978) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University) (on file with
Northwestern University Library).
52
See KIRSCHENBAUM, supra note 47, at 62.
5-1 See HOUN, supra note 48, at 72; JOHN I. THOMAS, EDUCATION FOR COMMUNISM 51-52
(1969).
54
See HOUN, supra note 48, at 70, 234.
55
See KJRSCHENBAUM, supra note 47, at 62; Croghan, supra note 51, at 85-86.
56
See THOMAS, supra note 53, at 64.
57
See HOUN, supra note 48, at 77-78; KIRSCHENBAUM, supra note 47, at 73-75; THOMAS,
supra note 53, at 68-71.
58
See Kirschenbaum, supra note 47, at 127.
59
See HOUN, supra note 48, at 71-73; THOMAS, supra note 53, at 51, 62-67.
60
See HOUN, supra note 48, at 77-78; KIRSCHENBAUM, supra note 47, at 73-75; THOMAS,
supra note 53, at 15, 51-82; Croghan, supra note 51, at 32, 80-89; Siebert Klein, supra note
50, at 76-131.
COMMUNIST CHINA
49
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Thus, in the hands of a totalitarian state, compulsory education has
provided an extremely effective means for destroying any possibility of
individual thought, so that the state may manipulate the minds of its
citizens to its own ends.
To be sure, the mere fact that both democracies and totalitarian
states employ a process of compulsory education does not automatically imply that by making use of this process a democracy necessarily
risks sinking into totalitarianism. By way of analogy, the fact that both
democracies and totalitarian states maintain police forces does not automatically suggest that by use of a police force a democracy is transformed into a dictatorship. On the other hand, this analogy should
give one pause about the democratic-totalitarian overlap in the use of
compulsory education systems. Because the presence of a governmentally operated police force is a hallmark of totalitarian regimes, the
American constitutional tradition has sought to impose strict limitations on the police's methods of law enforcement. 6 1 Yet few appear to
have recognized a similar need to impose constitutional restraints on
the state's use of compulsory education.
It is true, of course, that without.violating the First Amendment,
government may make its own contributions to the expressive marketplace. Government may urge its citizens not to drink and drive, to
support NAFTA, or to hate the nation's enemies. Government speech
is most certainly not an inherent violation of the First Amendment. 62
But the school setting gives rise to a unique and serious First Amendment concern. As the Supreme Court has wisely recognized, school
children are especially impressionable and therefore considerably
more vulnerable to authoritarian advocacy than normal adult citi61
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 15 (1968) (stating that
the U.S. Constitution protects individuals "against police conduct which is overbearing or
harassing, or which trenches upon personal security without the objective evidentiaryjustification which the Constitution requires"); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 62 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing that if government were to justify unannounced police
entries into the home upon the need to obtain evidence prior to its destruction, American
society would be no better than one in which "totalitarian police ... break[ I down the
door or smash[ ] the lock"); Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 149 (1954) (Frankfurter, J,
dissenting) (arguing that a "sturdy, self-respecting democratic community should not put
up with lawless police and prosecutors" for if law enforcement officials who intentionally
deprive others of their constitutional rights are not punished, society is headed for
totalitarianism).
62
See Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 680-81 (1998) ("[W]ith
the exception of traditional public fora, the government retains the choice of whether to
designate its property as a forum for specified classes of speakers."); Rosenberger v. Rector
& Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995) (holding that "when the State is the
speaker, it may make content-based choices"); see also MARK C. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT
SPEA.s, at xvi (1983) (arguing that in a "well-ordered democracy," communication flows in
two directions-from the people to the government and from the government to the
people).
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zens. 63 The students, whose minds are largely undeveloped at the
time they attend school, are exposed for the bulk of the day only to
the viewpoints of authoritarian governmental agents in school classrooms and hallways. Neither fact is true of the ordinary citizen exposed to a variety of viewpoints in a political debate. Thus, the
schools present a uniquely dangerous form of government speech of
the type traditionally utilized by totalitarian societies as a means for
destroying citizen mental autonomy.
The differences between the totalitarian and democratic operation of compulsory education may not be as dramatic as most have
generally assumed. This observation is demonstrated by an examination of how the public educational system has traditionally been employed in the United States to promote and induce patriotism among
the citizenry. Schools in the United States come closest to encouraging student identification with the state when they seek to instill a patriotic spirit in their students. However, patriotism was not always a
focus of America's schools. After the American Revolution, most citizens were concerned primarily with local issues. 64 Unlike most countries, there was no coordinated national effort to create a common
identity. 65 Following the Civil War, however, when private groups first
spearheaded efforts to establish a national identity, one of the first
places they targeted was public schools and the captive audience of
children found there. 66 Immigrant children were particularly
targeted. 6 7 Schools used children's books that were designed to teach
"devotional rites of patriotism,' 68 and that required children to memorize questions and answers in a manner reminiscent of a religious

63 See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 115 (2001) (holding that
"'symbolism of a union between church and state is most likely to influence children of
tender years, whose experience is limited and whose beliefs consequently are the function
of environment as much as of free and voluntary choice"' (quoting Sch. Dist. of Grand
Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 390 (1985))); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 584 (1987)
("Students in [public schools] are impressionable and their attendance is involuntary.");
see atsoJOSEPH TUSSMAN, GOVERNMENT AND THE MIND 53 (1977) ("The distinction between
minor and adult ...

is fundamental and inescapable ....

adequately govern both minor and adult ....
64

See CECILIA ELIZABETH O'LEARY,

To DIE

No single set of principles can

").
FOR: THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN PATRIOTISM

12 (1999).
65 See id. at 6-12.
66 See id. at 150, 172.
67 See id. at 172-73. Though originally public schools did not concern themselves
with homogenizing students, as waves of immigrants flowed to the United States, teachers
began to focus on "regulated and uniform behavior," id. at 155, so that by the time of
World War I, immigrants were pressed to relinquish their heritage and "[d ] istinctions between patriotism and Anglo-conformity became increasingly blurred," id. at 237.
68
Id. at 152.
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catechism. 69 By the late 1880s, public school teachers had begun to
experiment with other ways to increase patriotism, such as the ritualistic Pledge of Allegiance.7 0 Today, participating in flag ceremonies,
pledging allegiance, teaching American history, observing national
anniversaries, and teaching civics have all become central elements of
71
public school education.
72
The essence of totalitarian indoctrination is its completeness.
Just as totalitarianism in society seeks complete subordination of the
individual, 73 totalitarianism in public schools seeks the destruction of
a child's autonomy so that the state can mold the child according to
its desires.7 4 American society effectively prevents totalitarianism from
taking root outside of the school context. Public education, however,
is authoritarian by nature. And wherever there is power, there is a
temptation to abuse that power. 75 Therefore, totalitarianism in American public schools is not a purely imaginary concern, even in a democratic society. The best defense against the thought control of
totalitarianism is the development of individual minds, which illustrates why compulsory education must not be allowed to subvert the
right of free expression.

In considering compulsory education's troubling implications for
the First Amendment, it is important to emphasize what should not be
deemed primary constitutional concerns. Although it is certainly conceivable that students' First Amendment rights could be threatened in
69 For example, one question was, "What is the aim of the Public School?" Id. The
answer to be memorized was, "To train us in such habits of behavior as will best fit us to
become GOOD MEMBERS OF CIVIL SOCIETY AND PATRIOTIC AMERICANS." Id.
70 Id. at 151. In 1892, Americans celebrated the 400th anniversary of Christopher
Columbus's crossing of the Atlantic with parades, fireworks, and other activities designed
to honor "a great and courageous explorer, a cultural hero who brought two worlds together and initiated the 'rise of the West."' NASH ET AL., supra note 9, at 122. More than
100,000 schools raised the American flag that day and their principals led students in a
ritualistic pledge of allegiance, a practice that had commenced but a short time earlier. See
O'LEARY, supra note 64, at 167-71. But a society's take on history changes over time, as
evidenced by the fact that one hundred years later, in 1992, certain history scholars, Native
Americans, and even the National Council of Churches questioned the appropriateness of
celebrations to mark the anniversary, and mock trials branded Columbus a genocidal murderer. See NAsH ET AL., supra note 9, at 122-23.
71
Cf O'LEARY, supra note 64, at 180-85 (describing the beginning of such practices).
72 See FRIEDRICH & BRZEZINSKI, supra note 44, at 129-60 (noting how totalitarian regimes deployed constant repetition of their propaganda).
7.4 See Redish & Kaludis, supra note 44, at 1115 (noting how totalitarian governments
sought to destroy individual mental autonomy through the constant repetition of government propaganda).
74
Cf THOMAS, supra note 53, at 120 (stating that Communist education is "diametrically in opposition to freedom of thought and self-determination").
75 JOHN EMERICH EDWARD DALBERO-AcTON, ESSAYS ON FREEDOM AND POWER 364 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., 1949) ("Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts
absolutely.").
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a school setting, 76 we do not perceive any direct threat from a school's
curricular choices. No student has a First Amendment right to have
certain topics or subjects taught, or not to have them taught.7 7 Similarly, preemptive curricular decisions-whether made by school principals, school superintendents, school boards, or state-level school
officials-do not violate the First Amendment rights of teachers.
Whatever the scope of a teacher's First Amendment right to speak
outside the four walls of the school or to discuss in school matters
unrelated to the curriculum, 78 a teacher has no constitutional right to
teach the topics or substance of his choice. 79 This is true as a constitutional matter, regardless of how one feels about the issue as a matter
76

See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969)

(holding unconstitutional a school policy prohibiting students from wearing black arm
bands as a sign of protest against the Vietnam War).
77 See Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1069 (6th Cir. 1987)
(rejecting an argument that a student be excused from a school's reading program which
she claimed violated her Christian beliefs because the reading program did not compel
anyone "to accept any other religion as the equal of the one to which that person adheres"); Grove v. Mead Sch. Dist., 753 F.2d 1528, 1533-34 (9th Cir. 1985) (rejecting a
student challenge to use of a book as part of English literature curriculum because "[i] f we
are to eliminate everything that is objectionable to any of [the religious bodies existing in
the United States] or inconsistent with any of their doctrines, we will leave public education in shreds" (alteration in original) (quoting McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203,
235 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring))). In Mozert, a mother who described herself as a
"born again Christian" objected to a story involving mental telepathy that was assigned to
her daughter's sixth grade class. Though the woman's daughter was originally allowed to
attend an alternative reading program, the school board subsequently made the curriculum mandatory for all students. Several children were suspended for refusing to do the
work or attend reading classes. Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1060. The Sixth Circuit expressed little
sympathy for the rights of students and parents to create their own curricula within
schools, even where they raise Free Exercise claims. See id. at 1068-70 (denying the plaintiff's First Amendment claim). We intend, for the most part, to avoid in this Article the
special considerations related to the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment because they raise conceptually distinct issues. We note, however,
that with respect to the latter, the Supreme Court long ago made it clear that the duty to
prohibit the establishment of religion by a public school trumped many a curricular decision. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103 (1968) (holding that an Arkansas law
prohibiting the teaching of evolution because of its deemed conflict with certain religious
doctrines violated the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause of the U.S. Constitution). Though in Mozert, the Sixth Circuit analyzed the case along Free Exercise
grounds, we believe the analysis would apply beyond that narrow focus. The Court was
concerned with the ability of one student or that student's parents to dictate a whole curriculum. SeeMozert, 857 F.2d at 1069-70 ("[T]he Free Exercise Clause is written in terms of
what the government cannot do to the individual, not in terms of what the individual can
extract from the government." (alteration in original) (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S.
693, 700 (1986))). Consistent with our anti-indoctrination model, see infra Part III.E, we
note that the Sixth Circuit considered it important that there was no evidence that the
students had been required to affirm a belief in the subject of the readings or to accept
another religion as being equal to theirs. See Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1063-64, 69.
78 This, it turns out, gives rise to a considerably more complex constitutional question
than might at first appear. See infra Part IV.C.
79 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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of educational theory.8 0 The teacher serves as an agent of the state;
he is placed in his position in the classroom because some governmental agency has chosen him to convey information and reasoning
processes to students. Because the state has chosen to have a system
of compulsory education, 8 ' it is reasonable that the state should have
the final say as to what subjects are taught and what substance is conveyed about those subjects. The classroom, then, is not a public forum where a teacher has a private First Amendment right to
communicate.
The First Amendment concern we raise is somewhat more subtle
and indirect than the concerns raised by direct interferences with the
protected rights of either teachers or students to express themselves.
Our focus is on potential governmental interference with the conditions that are necessary to create and maintain a viable system of free
expression. Such interferences may be as harmful to free speech interests as any direct infringement, even though they do not, in and of
themselves, directly impinge upon free speech rights. For example, a
prohibition on a newspaper's ability to purchase publishing supplies
would undoubtedly raise First Amendment concerns, even if it did not
directly prohibit the newspaper from publishing. As already noted,
the same can be said of such ancillary First Amendment rights as the
8 2
right not to speak, the freedom of thought, or the right to associate.
In each case, interests that the First Amendment is clearly intended to
8
protect are threatened, even if expression is not directly restricted. 3
80 Perhaps a case can be made that a university professor at a public school has a right
to a certain "academic freedom." See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)
("Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom ....").But see Edwards v. Cal. Univ. of Pa., 156 F.3d 488, 491 (3d Cir. 1998) ("[W]e conclude that a public
university professor does not have a First Amendment right to decide what will be taught in
the classroom."); Scallet v. Rosenblum, 911 F. Supp. 999, 1016 (W.D. Va. 1996) (finding
that although a university professor's classroom speech may be protected at times, in this
particular case it was trumped by "Darden's pedagogical mission"). However, the same
right to academic freedom does not exist at the primary and secondary school levels. See
Ailsa W. Chang, Note, Resuscitatingthe Constitutional "Theory" of Academic Freedom: A Search for
a Standard Beyond Pickering and Connick, 53 STAN. L. REV. 915, 923-26 (2001) (noting that
"[t]races of the [Supreme] Court's willingness to protect the rights of teachers.., to teach
as they please at the secondary education level exist..., though to a lesser degree" than at
the university level). The vast majority of students in college have achieved majority status
and are, therefore, deemed to be capable of using theirjudgment in evaluating speech to a
much greater degree than minors. Moreover, although college students still may be "captive" in the sense that once they sign up for a class there are compelling reasons-such as
grades and teacher recommendations-for them to conform to the directives of the
teacher, at least the act of enrollment, both in college (as opposed to primary and secondary school) and in a particular class (most of the time), involves a voluntary decision on
the part of the student.
81 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
82 See discussion supra Part I.A.
83

See discussion supra Part I.A.
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It is true that the type of indirect interference that concerns us is
qualitatively different from the interference prevented by the other
examples of ancillary First Amendment protections. Each of those
guarantees negatively impacts a particular individual who may then
sue to vindicate her own personal right. When government crosses
the constitutional line in the scope of its curricular and non-curricular
education, no single individual student is harmed more than any
other. This does not mean, however, that the harm to constitutionally
protected interests is any less real. As the examination of the totalitar84
if
ian use of compulsory education so forcefully demonstrates,

abused, such a system can be anathema to the needs of democracy
and free expression. Preserving a right of free expression for brainwashed automatons would be a hollow protection indeed. Although
we do not intend to suggest that the American educational system
brings about such an extreme result, or that education in the United
States has been manipulated by government in the manner employed
by Mussolini or Stalin, it would be naive to conclude that the public
5
schools have never been used to serve governmental ends.
To recognize the potentially troubling First Amendment implications of the compulsory educational process, however, begins rather
than ends the constitutional inquiry. No one, of course, could reasonably suggest that the basic concept of compulsory public education
violates the First Amendment. Indeed, this conclusion would bring
about a truly Orwellian result by destroying in the name of democracy
a system that is universally recognized as essential to the viable operation of democracy. Democracy requires widespread public education.8 6 Therefore, some agent of the government will have to make
substantive choices in determining what to teach and what not to
teach. Thus, if one is to avoid throwing out the democratic baby with
the constitutional bath water, one must devise some method to distinguish the constitutionally troubling aspects of a state-created curriculum and educational process from those aspects that are not only
acceptable but politically essential.
Before one can effectively sort out the conceivable doctrinal approaches to this complex First Amendment issue, however, one must
explore the foundational theoretical intersection between education
and democracy. For it is only with that theoretical background that a
choice among the competing doctrinal alternatives can be coherent.
In undertaking this theoretical analysis, however, it is important to
See discussion supra Part I.B.
See discussion supra Part I.B.
John Adams and Thomas Jefferson both understood that the Bill of Rights would
not be able to protect citizens unless they were educated and informed. See Barber, supra
note 31, at 43-44; see also TuSSMAN, supra note 63, at 10-11 ("A polity must, if it is to
continue, recruit and incorporate new members .. ").
84
85
86
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clarify our conceptual focus. Because we examine the intersection between educational theory and democratic theory in order to resolve
the paradoxical First Amendment problems to which the intersection
gives rise, we focus our theoretical inquiry on that paradox. Thus, we
explore the implications of modern educational theory specifically for
the process of values-education. In other words, we ask, to what extent is it either appropriate or essential for the educational process in
a democratic society to convey predetermined societal values as part
of the educational process?
II
EDUCATIONAL THEORY, DEMOCRACY, AND THE TEACHING
OF VALUES

A. Values Inculcation and the Role of Public Education
It is nearly impossible not to convey some value judgments in the
process of educating students. Both the selection of topics to be
taught and decisions about what is to be taught concerning each topic
inherently imply certain choices as to social, moral, or political values.
The so-called "history wars" of the mid-1990s illustrate this problem.
In the fall of 1994, a governmentally appointed task force developed
"national history standards" for the nation's educational system. 8 7
Politicans and commentators challenged the draft standards as being
too politically correct and for downplaying "dates, facts, places, and
events" in an effort to rewrite history. 88 Regardless of which side of
this debate one ultimately favors, the implications for present purposes should be clear: it is unrealistic to believe that seemingly valueneutral curricular choices are completely free from significant, if
often unstated, substantive value judgments.
This does not mean, however, that the process of values inculcation cannot be reduced or expanded according to how central one
deems the conveyance of such values to the educational process. Educational scholar James Watkins has suggested four possible ways to approach the question of values inculcation in the course of the
educational process: (1) ignore it in order to prevent improper indoctrination; (2) assist students in clarifying their personal value system;
(3) teach students some procedural method that they can use to evaluate morality in a reasonable and objective rather than emotional or
irrational manner; or (4) openly teach a predetermined set of express
moral values.8 9 As this Part intends to make clear, the choice among
87
88
89

See NASH ET AL., supra note 9, at 156-87.
See id. at 188-248.
James W. Watkins, Forming a Value Curriculum: Two PhilosophicalIssues to Consider, in

MORAL EDUCATION

11, 11-13 (David Purpel & Kevin Ryan eds., 1976).
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these options cannot properly be made without placing educational
theory in the broader context of American political theory. In this
section, we consider the alternative ways in which educational and political theory might intersect. Determination of the nature and scope
of that intersection will, in turn, determine the role that values inculcation appropriately plays as part of a democratic society's educational
system.
B.

Teaching the Good Life: The Values-Enclave Approach

One conceivable approach to the values problem within the educational system would be to openly embrace the values-education intersection. According to this philosophy, the conveying of substantive
values is not only a necessary evil but actually an appropriate means,
and arguably the best opportunity, by which to instill community values in the nation's youth. 90 Those who advocate such an approach
could make the following argument: In a democratic society, government cannot be allowed to force its citizens to adopt a particular set of
social or moral values, at least as a purely constitutional matter. However, if society is not to degenerate into a series of unconnected or
conflicting interest groups loyal to no one but themselves, government must be permitted to take advantage of the educational process
in order to instill in children a largely consistent set of socialized values. 9 1 It is at this stage of life that individuals' cognitive morality may
be shaped. 92 Of course, once students leave the educational system
they will be able to act as the autonomous citizens contemplated by
democratic theory, but they will do so armed with the socialization
effected through education. We characterize this approach as the
"values-enclave" model, because it views the educational process as an
island of values inculcation within a sea of individual autonomy.
Such an approach fits well with the modern revival in American
political theory of civic republicanism, which disdains the narrow, pluralistic pursuit of private self-interest and favors instead a communitarian-based pursuit of the common good. 93 However, in a number of
90

See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, Responsible Republicanism: Educatingfor Citizenship, 62 U.

L. REv. 131, 156-57 (1995) (identifying responsibility as a virtue that students should
learn in school).
91 See William F. Connell, Moral Education: Aims and Methods in China, the U.S.S.R., the
U.S., and England, in MORAL EDUCATION, supra note 89, at 30, 39-42 (discussing important
virtues in moral education in U.S. and English schools); Watkins, supra note 89, at 12-13
(noting that one approach to moral education is to teach students a general accepted
value system so that they may "adjust to society").
92
See Lawrence Kohlberg, The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Moral Education, in
CHI.

MORAL EDUCATION,

9-

supra note 89, at 176, 176-80.

See, e.g., Linda R. Hirshman, The Virtue of Liberality in American Communal Life, 88
MICH. L. REv. 983, 993 (1990) (describing the civic republican concept of "rational deliberation to reason toward the common good"); Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J.
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ways the values-enclave model appears to pay considerably more homage to individual autonomy than do most forms of modern civic republicanism, which largely deny such independence even to adult
citizens. 94 Of course, if one were to accept fully the precepts of modern civic-republican theory, one would presumably need not make
such concessions to democratic individualism. 95 The point of the values-enclave theory as we have articulated it, however, is that even if
one were to reject the teachings of civic republicanism, one could nevertheless accept its essential premises solely within the confines of the
educational system.
From this perspective, values inculcation through the educational
process could be deemed a political version of a zoning ordinance: a
certain activity is considered acceptable only as long as it has been
confined to a circumscribed area. In this manner, society acquires the
benefit of the activity but avoids the risk that it will overrun the entire
community. According to this rationale, government-run schools
could dictate to students that patriotism is important, that the races
are equal, that individuals have the right of sexual preference, or that
drugs and tobacco are harmful, even though the government could
not constitutionally preempt debate on the accuracy of those postulates in adult political society. If this argument were accepted, then
the so-called democratic-educational paradox would be rendered a
complete non-issue: There is no paradox, because there exists a fundamental dichotomy, grounded in sound precepts of political theory,
between the educational process and the political operation of adult
society. It would be perfectly proper for government to employ its
schools, both within and without the curriculum, as a means for instilling in the nation's youth a set of shared values.
Because public education is, for the most part, not shaped at a
national level but rather by state or, more often, local governments,
1493, 1503-04 (1988) ("In the strongest versions of republicanism, citizenship-participation as an equal in public affairs, in pursuit of a common good-appears as a primary,
indeed constitutive, interest of the person."); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1550 (1988) (stating the republican belief that "in their capacity as
political actors, citizens and representatives are not supposed to ask only what is in their
private interest, but also what will best serve the community in general").
94 See supra text accompanying notes 20-22.
95 As one commentator has noted,
In its most classical versions, republican thought drew a sharp distinction
between public and private interests, and saw in public life an opportunity
to abandon or subordinate private interests in order to promote the public
good. Such understandings draw the most rigid of distinctions between private interests and public good; prepolitical differences are an inadmissible
basis for resolution of political controversy. Understandings of this kind
depend on an expectation that citizens should entirely abandon their private identities when they come to politics.
Sunstein, supra note 93, at 1564 (footnote omitted).
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there would be no way to ensure that students throughout the nation
learn uniform values. But that fact may actually work in favor of the
civic-republican model, because it reduces the dangers of tyranny that
might otherwise be associated with it.9 6 In any event, it is likely that
many of the substantive values taught would be identical, including
patriotism, racial and gender equality, and opposition to drugs and
tobacco use.
The civic republican model is nevertheless troubling on a theoretical level for several reasons. One of those reasons concerns issues
of democratic process. Traditionally, it has been thought that education is essential preparation for an individual to function in a democratic society as an autonomous, free-thinking entity. 97 But if that is
true, then an educational system that openly seeks to instill unquestioning belief in a predetermined set of values can hardly be deemed
proper preparation for such autonomous thought processes. Indeed,
use of that model would seem to seriously undermine the goal of producing free-thinking individuals. Such an approach appears to bear
ominous similarities to the strategies employed by totalitarian societies
in an effort to produce submissive mental automatons. Therefore,
this approach arguably undermines the meaningful exercise of free
expression by adults because the adults it produces will, for the most
part,98 be incapable of the meaningful exercise of that right. Moreover, allowing government to convey only select values to a captive and
impressionable audience effectively distorts the marketplace of ideas,
much the way that viewpoint-based regulations do. 99
96 See id. at 1571 (noting that some critics of modern republicanism stress the "dangers of totalitarianism that are built into the traditional republican belief in the subordination of private interests to the common good").
97 See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 3, at 86; Barber, supra note 31, at 43-44.
98 It is true, of course, that use of an open-values inculcation approach will not destroy mental autonomy for all individuals. There will always be those who dissent and those
who question. That fact, however, does not undermine the democratic-First Amendment
critique of the civic republican model. Even in totalitarian societies, organized brainwashing does not work for every individual. But that fact does not render such a process
any less dubious from the perspective of free speech and democratic theory.
99 See Stone, supra note 38, at 197-200. It is true that government may achieve much
the same result through direct governmental contributions to public debate. For that very
reason, certain scholars have argued that government speech violates the First Amendment. See, e.g., Kamenshine, supra note 30, at 1119 (arguing that the implied political
establishment clause "protect[s] the free speech values on which a democratic system depends from the specific threat posed by government propagandizing"). One need not
adopt that view, however, to conclude that governmental inculcation of values through
public education violates the First Amendment. One could, quite reasonably, find governmental contributions to public debate acceptable because individuals who do not wish to
receive those contributions may avoid them, and in any event are presumably exposed
simultaneously to the expression of counter views. The same is not true in the educational
context. See supra text accompanying notes 1-10. Moreover, as totalitarian strategists reasoned, youth constitute the most impressionable and easily molded grouping in society.
See discussion supra Part I.B.
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Rejection of the civic-republican model of educational-political
theory does not automatically imply that all values inculcation should
be excised from the educational process. As some educational scholars have correctly noted, "It is inconceivable for the schools to take
the child for six or seven hours a day, for 180 days a year, from the
time he is six to the time he is eighteen, and not affect the way he
thinks about moral issues and the way he behaves."10 0 It does not follow, however, that government is appropriately granted carte blanche
to employ the educational process as a means for conveying to children a predetermined set of substantive values.
C.

The "Values-Clarification" Alternative: Focusing on Process
Rather than Substance

Proponents of a values-clarification approach recognize the potential for indoctrination inherent in educational theories advocating
the transmission of values from school to pupil. They therefore seek
to focus education on "the process of valuing, not on the transmission
of the 'right' set of values."1'0 Justifications for use of a values-clarification approach differ. Some argue that moral education is "caught
and not taught"; 10 2 others fear indoctrination where schools have a
substantive set of values; 10 3 and still others see the futility of having
schools inculcate morals.' 0 4 But most agree that the best alternative is
to have students "look at the lives they are leading.' 10 5
Ultimately underlying the values-clarification approach is the belief that each person at some time or another reaches a point when
she questions the values that she has learned; thus, indoctrination as
part of the educational process only postpones the inevitable.

0

6

It is

far better for schools to "teach appropriate ways of responding to
100

David Purpel & Kevin Ryan, Moral Education: What Is It and Where Are We?, in MORAL

101

supra note 89, at 9.
Sidney B. Simon, Values Clarification vs. Indoctrination, in

104

See, e.g., Louis Raths et al., Selection from Values and Teaching, in MORAL EDUCATION,

EDUCATION,

MORAL EDUCATION, supra
note 89, at 126, 127.
102 See, e.g., David Purpel & Kevin Ryan, Moral Education in the Classroom: Some Instructional Issues, in MORAL EDUCATION, supra note 89, at 55, 61. Some educational scholars
suggest that although schools may be able to teach that the United States was involved in
World War II from 1941 to 1945, they cannot teach students to be moral. Rather, students
learn this throughout the course of their lives. See, e.g., id.
103
See, e.g., Simon, supra note 101, at 126-28.

supra note 89, at 85 ("As teachers, then, we need to be clear that we cannot dictate to
children what their values should be since we cannot also dictate what their environments
should be and what experiences they will have.").
105 Simon, supra note 101, at 134 (emphasis omitted); see also Raths et al., supra note
104, at 87 (describing the values-clarification approach as "put[ting] the responsibility on
the student to look at his behavior or his ideas and to think and decide for himself what it
is he wants").
106 See Simon, supra note 101, at 135.
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moral issues and concerns" than it is to instill a specific set of values
through moral education. 0 7 This is especially true in American democratic society, where "there is no antecedent social blueprint which is
itself to be taken as a dogma immune to critical evaluation in the pub' 08

lic forum."'

The theory of values clarification has waned considerably since its
heyday in the mid-1970s through mid-1980s, 10 9 because critics observed that the approach treated children as if they were adults who
had already formed sound moral opinions and offered no standard
for distinguishing between what students might want to do and what
they ought to do. 1 10 Thus, critics feared that values clarification
would encourage students to develop ethical relativism, where each
Some
student's own set of moral values is no worse than any other.'
even argued that values clarification was more like therapy than an
2
educational philosophy."
A values-clarification approach seeks to expose students to alternative value structures while simultaneously avoiding the dangers of
indoctrination inherently associated with the values-enclave approach. 113 Those espousing notions of "The Good Life" flaunt notions of epistemological humility and implicitly reject fundamental
democratic principles by failing to allow for differences of opinion as
to what is "right" or "true."' 1 4 Values-clarification proponents, on the
other hand, deny (or at least doubt) the ability of schools to select the
"right" values and virtues to transmit to students, and recognize either
that there is a risk that the school will be wrong or that it has no place
advocating one set of values no matter how "right" it may appear to
be.' '5 Nevertheless, these concerns illustrate how values clarification
itself goes awry, for if the school will not know what values are "correct," and if it is not the school's place to choose values, how is the
Purpel & Ryan, supra note 102, at 57 (emphasis omitted).
108 Israel Scheffler, The Moral Content of American Public Education, in MORAL EDUCATION, supra note 89, at 20, 21.
109 John Leo, C is for Character,U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 15, 1999, at 20.
110 See THoMAS LICKONA, EDUCATING FOR CHARACTER: How OUR SCHOOLS CAN TEACH
107

RESPECT AND RESPONSIBILITY 11 (1991).
111
See, e.g., John S. Stewart, Problems and Contradictions of Values Clarification, in MORAL
EDUCATION, supra note 89, at 136, 142-46.
112 See, e.g., Alan L. Lockwood, A Critical View of Values Claification,in MORAL EDUCATION, supra note 89, at 152, 158-64.
113 For a discussion of the values-enclave approach, see supra Part II.B.
114
See, e.g., Hirshman, supra note 93, at 994 ("[T]he goal of social justice cannot be
understood absent a conception of the good life for human beings and the role of the
society in that life; the character of the citizenry is inextricably intertwined with the larger
social issues."). Of course, those who favor "The Good Life" would contend that they know
what values to teach and instill. Yet who can forget that for much of the United States'
history it seemed natural to teach that members of one race were inferior to those of
another?
115
See Raths et al., supra note 104, at 84-85.
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educational process any better if the school introduces the subject of
values and has the students speak openly about their own values?
Surely, the disapproval (even if expressed in a very minimal, unintentional way) of an authoritarian teacher or peer pressure from a majority of a student's classmates could undermine a particular student's
values. Thus, the theory raises a concern about the ability of schools
to actively shape or even address values in the first place, especially if
these values are not tied to the curriculum. Although values clarification starts students along the road toward critical thinking,' 16 it does
so at a distance. Indeed, when detached from academic endeavors,
values clarification does seem more like therapy'" 7 (or some version
of the Socratic dialogue employed in law school), during which students are not told where to go but are encouraged to find the answer
themselves. This seems to be a dubious and dangerous method, especially as applied to younger students.
D.

The "Cognitive" Alternative: Promoting Critical Thinking

As a general matter, no one worries that the government is seeking to "indoctrinate" adults when, for instance, the President gives his
State of the Union address or some administrative agency issues a report on an issue of national concern. The reasons are obvious: Adults
are not a captive audience compelled to listen to the government's
speech, and often another party presents competing speech as a
countermessage. Moreover, although young minds are not fully developed and presumably are more susceptible to indoctrination because they lack the ability to think critically and evaluate messages, we
presume adults are capable of analyzing the variety of messages they
hear on a daily basis.
If one begins with the premises that schools' inculcation of values
raises social and political concerns but also that schools cannot practically or theoretically exclude all values discussion and analysis from
the educational process, then the most reasonable alternative may be
for schools to confine their values inquiry to an exploration of the
process by which value choices are made. 1 8 After all, in the adult
world individuals must regularly make value choices. Adults are constantly presented with competing messages in political, social, and economic realms. Each of us must make an individual choice to accept
some messages and reject others. It would be counterproductive,
116 For a discussion of the educational philosophy favoring the teaching of critical
thinking and cognitive reasoning, see infra Part I.D.
117 See Lockwood, supra note 112, at 158-64.
118 Cf Raths et al., supra note 104, at 76 (discussing the values-clarification approach
but noting that the process by which an individual obtains his values is more important
than the actual substantive values that result).
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then, to educate children for more than a decade in an environment
in which the state preselects all their values. Surely, such an educational system will do little to prepare individuals for the lives they will
someday lead. 119
Those who consider the purpose of education to be to prepare
individuals to function as citizens within a democratic society have
often recognized critical thinking and cognitive reasoning as essential
elements of educational philosophy. 120 Richard Arneson and Ian Shapiro, for example, argue that the "development of skills and habits of
critical thinking" is the key to educating for autonomy.1 2 1 Rather than
instinctively acting from some conditioned response, the student
skilled in the practice of critical thinking is "capable of standing back
from her values," reconsidering them in light of the circumstances,
and then adjusting them if appropriate. 2 2 Thus, regardless of a
child's upbringing, the ability to think critically and to reason cognitively is necessary to enable each child to evaluate her environment
over time.
One can see how critical thinking and cognitive reasoning attempt to fill in the gaps of the earlier models. The key to preparing
students for adulthood is not the indoctrination of values that will undermine the child's ability to think and act autonomously, which they
will need to do as adults in a democratic state. 123 Nor is it striving
towards the impossible goal of valueless education. Nor is it solely
about the "clarification" of one's values so that one does not challenge
or change one's assumed values. Rather, critical thinking entails the
ability to recognize one's own values, evaluate them constantly, and
adjust them when necessary. 124 These skills are vital whenever one
exercises one's democratic rights, either in deciding for whom to vote
125
or for more actively engaging oneself in the political arena.
119

Of course, those who do not want children to think for themselves oppose any

educational philosophy encouraging such behavior. See BARBARA PARKER & STEFANIE WEISS,
PROTECTING THE FREEDOM TO LEARN 18 (1983) (pointing out that Christian fundamental-

ists dislike secular humanism because it encourages children to think for themselves).
120 See, e.g., Barber, supra note 31, at 44 (describing "civic literacy" as "encompass [ing]
the competence to participate in democratic communities [and] the ability to think critically and act with deliberation in a pluralistic world").
Richard Arneson & Ian Shapiro, Democratic Autonomy and Religious Freedom: A Cri121
tique ofWisconsin v. Yoder, in DEMOCRACY'S PLACE 137, 162 (Ian Shapiro ed., 1996).
See id.
122
123
The ability to think autonomously is an absolute necessity for the adult in contemporary society. For instance, adult consumers should evaluate various forms of advertising
and product descriptions before making a purchase in order to make sure they get what
they want at the best price.
124 See Arneson & Shapiro, supra note 121, at 137, 162.
125 For example, a child in the classroom may someday want to be a school board
member. Thus, that individual would need to have the ability to critically evaluate the
school's curriculum to ensure the next generation of autonomous individuals.

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88:62

Of course, school is not the same environment as the adult world,
and children are not expected to be autonomous individuals. Amy
Gutmann parted ways with the liberal view that the educational system
should remain as value neutral as possible for these reasons. She argues that children cannot be taught principles; rather, they must be
taught rules. 126 Only after they understand the rule can children be-

gin to learn the reasons supporting

it.12

7

If what Gutmann says is true, one faces another paradox: Students should think critically about their lives and the world, but to do
so, they must have some sense of how to rank and evaluate the things
that the nation (or local community) values. However, in giving students a sense of how a group of elders values certain things, society
risks indoctrinating them and destroying their ability to reason, to
think critically, and to challenge their elders' values. One possible
escape from this paradox is to say that private individuals, such as a
child's parents, should provide the substantive values, and that schools
12
should teach only the process of critical thinking.
E.

Summary: The First Amendment and the Misguided Ideal of
a Valueless Education

For the most part, acceptance or rejection of the theories examined in this Part turns on issues of educational and political theory,
rather than on issues of constitutional law. It is difficult to imagine,
for example, that the First Amendment could somehow be construed
to require government to employ the cognitive model or the valuesclarification model as controlling educational theory. The choice
among most of the conceivable models of intersecting educational
and political theories turns on issues of social and educational policy
126

See GUTMANN, supra note 12, at 35 ("To have a rational sense of what we want to

become, we need

to know who we are; otherwise our choices will be endless and

meaningless.").
127 See id. at 60 ("Very few sixteen-year-olds (or adults) ever embrace the morality of
principle, and there is no evidence to credit schools with this rare accomplishment. Although it is possible that there is a way that schools can teach autonomy, nobody has come
even close to finding it." (footnote omitted)).

Thus, Gutmann argues,

Children are not taught that bigotry is bad, for example, by offering it as
one among many competing conceptions of the good life, and then subjecting it to criticism .... Children first become the kind of people who are
repelled by bigotry, and then they feel the force of the reasons for their

repulsion.
Id. at 43; see also Kate Zernike, Parents Hungry for A B C's Find Schools Don't Add Up, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 28, 2001, at Al (stating that some parents have rebelled against the educational
philosophy of teaching children "how to learn" and have sought educational environments
that go "back to basics" and focus on reading, writing, and arithmetic).
128

But even in this situation students would receive some limited values through the

curricular subjects.
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that are not, in a democratic society, properly made by unelected and
unrepresentative judges.
It does not necessarily follow, however, that no conceivable
choice-of-values methodology could have First Amendment implications. Unless one adopts-mistakenly, we believe-the epistemologically arrogant version of modern civic republicanism as controlling
American political and constitutional theory, 129 governmentally
orchestrated values inculcation of a captive and uniquely impressionable audience cannot be consistent with the notion, fundamental to
democratic theory, that government is responsible to a free-willed and
free-thinking electorate.
Even in a democratic society, government need not and could
not be totally value neutral. Any government makes normative
choices. That different elected officials would, at least in some cases,
make different normative choices is, after all, the very reason elections
are needed in the first place. Moreover, government may appropriately seek to influence public attitudes on normative issues by making
its own contributions to public debate. 130 Butjust as government may
13
not shape that debate by selectively censoring private expression,

1

it

should not employ the educational process as the basis for naked val132
ues inculcation.
One might make an argument, following the path laid out by
Robert Dahl,133 that an exception to the constitutional prohibition on
naked values inculcation in the educational process should be made

for teaching the value of democracy itself. 134 Otherwise, the argument would proceed, the system of free expression could lead to the
counterproductive destruction of the very political values that make
free expression both possible and meaningful.1 35 But this logic proves
too much, for it would also lead to the selective suppression of antidemocratic speech. 1 36 After all, if such speech is sufficiently persuasive, it could also lead to the destruction of the American democratic
system. Although respected scholars have occasionally advocated this
129
130
131
132

See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
See discussion supra Part I.A.
For the definition of "naked values inculcation," see infra text accompanying note

139.
133
For a discussion of Robert Dahl's analysis concerning shared values, see supra note
21 and accompanying text.
134

See DAHL, supra note 21, at 157-58.

See id. (" [U] nless a substantial majority of citizens prefer democracy and its political
institutions to any nondemocratic alternative and support political leaders who uphold
democratic practices, democracy is unlikely to survive through its inevitable crises.").
136
The same logic could also lead to the conclusion that government could constitutionally require adults to attend democracy indoctrination classes, though we have little
doubt that this practice would and should be held to violate the First Amendment. See
discussion supra Part I.A.
135
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conclusion, 3 7 there can be little doubt that it would contravene the
well-established First Amendment prohibition on viewpoint-based regulation.' 3 8 If, as we argue, selective-values inculcation through the educational process is the equivalent of viewpoint-based regulation, then
there is no reason to make an exception for democracy promotion for
purposes of the former than there is for purposes of the latter.
Note, however, that we do not say that the educational process
can never be used as a means of values instruction. We merely argue
that under the First Amendment it should not be employed as a
means of naked values inculcation, by which we mean a process of inculcating values in students that is not ancillary to or intertwined with the
teaching of academic courses. It would be folly to attempt to divorce
completely the educational process from the instillation of values, for
the simple reason that the judgmental necessity139 inherent in selecting what topics to discuss and what to say about those topics is an
inescapable element of any educational process. However, when government seeks to inculcate values apart from this ancillary role in the
process of educating students, it exceeds the limits of the First
Amendment.
The task we have assumed in this Article is to explain how to separate inherent values education from naked values inculcation. Before
we describe our suggested approach for drawing that distinction, however, it is helpful to describe other suggested scholarly approaches to
the First Amendment question, so that we may place our own First
Amendment model in its broader intellectual context.
III
FASHIONING A FIRST AMENDMENT MODEL TO CONTROL
VALUES INCULCATION IN PUBLIC EDUCATION

A.

An Overview of the Doctrinal Options

A number of conceivable models exist by which to control values
inculcation through the educational process. At one extreme, one
could argue that whatever First Amendment problems plague the edu137 See, e.g., Carl A. Auerbach, The Communist Control Act of 1954: A Proposed Legal-Political Theoy ofFree Speech, 23 U. CHI. L. REV. 173, 189 (1956) ("The basic 'postulate' . ..which
should 'limit and control' the First Amendment is that it is part of the framework for a
constitutional democracy and should . . . not be used to curb the power of Congress to
exclude from the political struggle those groups which, if victorious, would crush
democracy ....").
138 See supra notes 33-40 and accompanying text.
139 The concept of 'judgmental necessity" recognizes that government officials are required to make some choice among competing options when making curricular decisions
and accordingly should not be penalized for choosing one option over another. For an
application of the judgmental necessity concept in a different First Amendment concept,
see REDISH, supra note 36, at 215-17.
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cational process, it is infeasible and unrealistic for the judiciary to exercise any meaningful control over what or how a school teaches its
students. Therefore courts should generally abstain from interfering
with either of those choices. 140 At the other extreme, some commentators have suggested that the courts should effectively transport traditional First Amendment analysis into the classroom. 14 1 For a variety of
reasons, neither of these options provides a viable solution to the
problem. As will be seen, it is possible to fashion some limitations on
governmental power to inculcate values through the educational process, though the practical realities of the situation impose obvious restrictions on the scope of judicial power to do so.

142

For theoretical

reasons already discussed, however, it is improper to treat the relevance of the First Amendment in the educational context as fungible
with its role in adult society. 1 43 Nevertheless, scholars have also suggested several intermediate approaches. The following subparts provide a critical analysis of these alternatives.
B.

The Abdication Alternative

Although debate may exist over the rationale underlying the abdication alternative, the nature of its operation is well settled. Adoption of this approach signifies that the judiciary should abstain from
any involvement in a First Amendment challenge to a school's choice
of what to teach. 1 44 Under this model, a court would base its decision
not on a substantive assessment of the constitutional implications of
the challenged school action, but rather on a preliminary determination of the character of the legal issue being raised: once the court
determined that the case involved such a First Amendment issue, it
would dismiss at least that part of it without ever considering the
45
merits.
140
See, e.g., William G. Buss, Academic Freedom and Freedom of Speech: Communicating the
Curriculum, 2 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 213, 278 (1999) (suggesting reliance on "the wise
exercise of power" by school officials). On occasion, scholars have reached this conclusion
primarily on the basis of theoretical analysis. See, e.g., Stephen R. Goldstein, The Asserted
ConstitutionalRight of Public School Teachers to Determine What They Teach, 124 U. PA. L. REv.
1293, 1351 (1976) (arguing that there is "no sound theoretical basis ... for the view that
the Constitution precludes value inculcation as a function of public education").
141
See, e.g., Tyll van Geel, The Searchfor ConstitutionalLimits on GovernmentalAuthority to
Inculcate Youth, 62 TEX. L. REv. 197, 260-62 (1983).
142
See infra Part III.E.
143
See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
144
This abdication approach would apply solely to free-speech challenges to the content of the curriculum, and not to challenges under the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment.
145
See van Geel, supra note 141, at 203-04 (discussing this "free-hand" approach to
curricular decision making in Presidents Council v. Community School Board, 457 F.2d 289 (2d
Cir. 1972)).
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Scholars advance two rationales for the abdication alternative,
one theoretical and the other pragmatic. On a theoretical level, a
court relying on a version of the civic republican model1 46 could reason that it is perfectly appropriate for society to attempt to inculcate a
predetermined set of values through its schools. 14 7 Accordingly, government may develop a sense of community among its citizens by engendering a set of shared fundamental values among students whose
thought processes have not yet fully evolved.1 48 Under this view, the
First Amendment is not necessarily superseded, but is instead confined in its application to situations in which government seeks to censor or suppress the expression of adults on the basis of disagreement
14
with the views being expressed. '

The pragmatic rationale for the abdication model is that it is simply too difficult for courts to distinguish between the acceptable transmission of values through the curriculum and the impermissible
transmission of values through the educational process. However one
ultimately defines curriculum-broadly 5ll or narrowly-we think such
a distinction would merely encourage schools to label everything they
are doing as "curricular" so as to skirt review by the courts. The fight
would therefore become a definitional one. The abdication approach
ignores the method that the state employs within the curriculum and
thus allows the school to instill values in any manner so long as there
is a tie to the curriculum. 5 1 This absolute deference to the school
goes too far and threatens individual autonomy through indoctrination. Thus, we find that the abdication alternative suffers from several
defects: it is definitionally difficult to establish and administer; it encourages schools to be devious; it fails to properly limit government
speech when some activity or lesson is defined as curricular but actually indoctrinates students; and it fails to draw distinctions within the
curriculum.

146
147

See supra Part II.B.
See, e.g., Sherry, supra note 90, at 157 (arguing that children need to learn moral

character, critical thinking, and cultural literacy to be responsible republican citizens).
148
See Watkins, supra note 89, at 12.
149
See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-07 (1968) (holding unconstitutional an Arkansas law proscribing the teaching of a body of knowledge solely because it
conflicted with a particular religious doctrine and concluding that "[t]he State's undoubted right to prescribe the curriculum for its public schools" does not include the right
to prohibit "the teaching of a scientific theory or doctrine where the prohibition is based
upon reasons that violate the First Amendment").
150
See supra note 24 (discussing the Fourth Circuit's adoption of a broad definition of
curriculum in Boring v. Buncombe County Board of Education, 136 F.3d 364, 367-68 (4th Cir.

1998)).
151

See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
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The Fairness Model

An alternative model would require schools to explore all the
competing approaches to issues of moral value.1 52 In this way, the
approach's advocates may argue, students will be exposed to a variety
of moral frameworks and schools will not discriminate against particular viewpoints. In a sense, this approach parallels the Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) fairness doctrine, established in the
1960s but long since abandoned by the Commission, which required
radio and television broadcast stations to provide an opportunity for
the expression of different sides of public issues. 153 In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
the doctrine.' 54 Because of its similarity to the FCC's doctrine, this
approach may be described as "the fairness model."
Robert Kamenshine has made the most prominent attempt to apply the rationale of broadcasting's fairness doctrine to First Amendment restrictions on school curricular decisions. He argues that the
First Amendment contains an implied political establishment clause
that "protect[s] the free speech values on which a democratic system
depends from the specific threat posed by government propagandizing."' 55 Kamenshine also argues that a constitutionally impermissible
political establishment is created when schools present only one political viewpoint on an issue. 156 Kamenshine is not alone in his support
of the fairness doctrine. Other scholars have advocated variations on
the fairness model,1 57 and courts have adopted it as well, albeit
implicily.1 58
'See Kamenshine, supra note 30, at 1132-38.
153 See Mary Harter Mitchell, Secularism in Public Education: The ConstitutionalIssues, 67
B.U. L. RiV. 603, 741 (1987).
154 395 U.S. 367, 375 (1969). The Court did not actually require the fairness doctrine,
but held the Commission's policy constitutional. The FCC subsequently repealed the regulation in 1987. Mitchell, supra note 153, at 741 n.699.
155
Kamenshine, supra note 30, at 1119.
156
See id. at 1115-19. Thus, presumably textbooks would have to present various sides
to controversial issues, even those depicting the negative outlook some groups have towards race relations. See id. at 1136-38.
157
See, e.g., Stephen E. Gottlieb, In the Name of Patriotism: The Constitutionalityof "Bending"History in Public Secondary Schools, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 497, 561-64 (1987) (drawing upon
the "checking value" of the First Amendment to require fairness with respect to controversial matters in public schools); James C. O'Brien, Note, The Promise ofPico: A New Definition
of Orthodoxy, 97 YALE L.J. 1805, 1823-24 (1988) (arguing that schools may vigorously advocate community values, but must do so fairly so that courts reviewing school policy will look
at how-rather than what-subjects are taught in school to prohibit the establishment of
orthodoxy).
158
See Loewen v. Turnipseed, 488 F. Supp. 1138, 1155 (N.D. Miss. 1980) (ordering the
Mississippi State Textbook Purchasing Board to place a previously rejected textbook on the
list of textbooks approved for use in schools); Wilson v. Chancellor, 418 F. Supp. 1358,
1361-64 (D. Or. 1976) (holding that the decision to preclude a Communist from speaking
in school after the school permitted a Democrat, a Republican, and a member of the John
152
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On the most abstract level, it is probably accurate to suggest that
if a reviewing court were to use the fairness model, it would effectively
restrict the state's ability to indoctrinate the nation's youth through
the public educational system. However, the model is plagued by numerous problems that render it unacceptable as a governing mode of
First Amendment interpretation. On a purely practical level, the idea
that courts could effectively enforce the doctrine is mere fantasy. The
courts would have to police countless curricular decisions, perhaps on
a daily basis. More theoretically, the idea that the Constitution requires schools to describe all viewpoints on issues of public importance, whether or not school officials deem those viewpoints valid,
would seriously undermine the judgmental discretion inherent in the
educational process. By its nature, the educational process requires
the making of triage decisions. Not everything may be taught because
there is insufficient time in the school year. Moreover, such an indiscriminate form of information transmission could produce considerably more confusion than it prevents. Therefore, it would create
educational havoc to construe the First Amendment to require that
schools teach students all sides of a public issue regardless of whether
educators have concluded, either because they believe there are more
important things to teach or because they believe that some of the
positions on an issue are wrong, that they should not teach some of
those positions. Thus, although we are clearly concerned about the
government's ability to inculcate values in its captive and malleable
student audience, 159 we do not believe that the solution is to compel
the government to present a message directly opposed to its position.' 6°1 If a school selects a history text that says that the Nazi Party
killed six million Jews, it would be unreasonable to require the school
to state also that there are those who assert that the Holocaust never
16
happened or to spend time portraying the Nazis in a positive light. '
Birch Society to speak violated the students' right to hear and the teacher's right of
expression).
159 See discussion supra Part I.B.
160 One of us has previously criticized the fairness doctrine as applied to private broadcasters as being "so vague and manipulable that [it] easily could be employed as a covert
means of suppression." Redish & Kaludis, supra note 44, at 1111-12. Although it is true
with respect to public schools that the government is the party being checked, not the
party checking, it is equally likely that private interest groups could manipulate the principle in their favor and effectively disrupt the communicative ability of the government,
which at least is democratically accountable. Given that in this situation the audience consists of impressionable children, the doctrine may do more harm than good, such as when
the fairness doctrine requires schools to present to young school children the views of the
Ku Klux Klan.
161
If the fairness model were applied to schools, one might reasonably predict that
schools would avoid all political and controversial matters. This result would hardly further the purposes of either the right of free expression or education generally.
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Advocates of the fairness model correctly identify the major concern in public schools as the indoctrination of a captive audience of
undeveloped and impressionable minds. However, their proposed solution suffers from numerous fatal flaws. The fairness model would
effectively prevent educational officials from making fundamental
pedagogical choices in framing a curriculum. Moreover, it would give
rise to a nightmarish judicial quagmire by calling upon the courts to
determine exactly what in the school's curriculum is political, controversial, or unfair, and therefore subject to the First Amendment's requirement of fairness. The fairness approach, then, is a classic
illustration of a cure that is considerably more harmful than the
disease.
D.

Procedural and Structural Models

The doctrinal models considered to this point have focused on
attempts to control the actual process of values inculcation. It is possible, however, to fashion an approach that seeks to act in a prophylactic manner by regulating the procedural or structural aspects of the
educational process. The underlying theory is that abuse is least likely
if the process of curricular choice is regularized. 62 Procedural and
structural approaches possess the practical advantage of relative ease
16
of application and enforcement.

3

One such approach attempts to avoid improper values inculcation by assuring that substantive curricular choices are made by professional educators rather than political officials. Of course, it would
defy reality to suggest that the political and educational processes can
be completely divorced from each other. Every state constitution addresses the legislature's responsibility to provide for a public school
system,' 64 and though the common perception is that control is exercised primarily at the local level, school districts possess only the
power that the state government has granted them. 65 Because such
legislative delegation is common, however, Mark Yudof has argued
that the best means by which courts may check the government's attempts to inculcate values in the public school setting is by what he
1' 66
has termed the "doctrine of irrevocability of delegated authority.
162
See, e.g., van Geel, supra note 141, at 213-17 (describing the procedural approach
to judicial review of curricular decisions as a means to ensure that school officials consider
free speech and free expression rights when making curricular choices).
163
See id. at 217.
164
See MCCARTHY ET AL., supra note 5, at 2.
165
States vary as to the amount of decision making they allow local school boards to

exert. See id. at 3-10.
166 Yudof, supra note 30, at 553. Yudof argues that once a state grants general curricular decision-making authority to a school board, it cannot revoke the school board's decision in particular instances simply because it disagrees with a specific decision. Id.
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In other words, although the state legislature is not constitutionally
obligated to delegate educational decision making authority, if the
legislature chooses to do so, the First Amendment bars the state's selective retrenchment of that delegation. The rationale for such a standard is the categorical assumption that such individualized
revocations will inevitably reflect the undue influence of the political
16 7
process on the educational system.
Conceivably, one could narrow the acceptable decision-making
chain of command even further in an attempt to prevent unconstitutional values inculcation. For example, one might reason that the
only effective means of ensuring that government does not manipulate the educational process as a means of political indoctrination is to
require teachers, rather than administrators or other government officials, to make all curricular decisions.1 68 As a practical matter, such
an approach could best be implemented by recognizing a teacher's
First Amendment right to make curricular decisions within her own
classroom. 169
Use of such a doctrinal model, however, would undoubtedly give
rise to intractable problems. It is true that to a certain extent teachers
have First Amendment rights to engage in expression and association
outside of the school setting. 170 But as teachers they have been hired
by the state to perform a certain communicative function, and are
being subsidized to do so. An individual hired to serve as official
spokesperson for the mayor, for example, cannot reasonably claim a
First Amendment right to communicate, in her official capacity, derogatory opinions about the mayor. 171 In a fundamental sense, public
school teachers within the classroom are operating in an identical
manner, as the selected communicator of information and opinion
formulated by their employers. 172 To be sure, as a practical matter
school administrators may often choose to delegate to teachers the
167
See id. at 553-56. It should be noted that although Yudof would prohibit the state
from withdrawing delegations retroactively in particular controversies, he finds no constitutional problem in a generalized and prospective revocation. See id.
168
Cf JOHN DEwEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION 62-63 (Free Press 1966) (1916)
(favoring a policy whereby school boards provide only highly generalized directions to
teachers rather than definite tasks to be carried out); William Van Alstyne, The Constitutional Rights of Teachers and Professors, 1970 DUKE L.J. 841, 854-58 (arguing that the public
interest is served when a teacher does not have to submit to the "authoritarian demand" of
the state wishing to impart only one view upon students).
169
See Van Alstyne, supra note 168, at 857 ("[A] teacher violating a statutory restriction
forbidding reference to ...a source of opinion or information otherwise within the proper
compass of his subject should be ... shielded by the [F]irst [A]mendment ....").
170
See supra note 17 and accompanying text. The outer reaches of such a right, it
should be noted, may be subject to debate under certain circumstances. See infra Part IV.C.
171
See, e.g., Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568-69 (1968).
172
For a more detailed version of this argument, see Goldstein, supra note 140, at
1340-41.
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authority to shape the individual class curriculum. But if they do so, it
is a decision grounded in convenience and educational philosophy,
not First Amendment theory.

73

Of course, one may believe that the rationale for recognizing an
individual teacher's First Amendment right within the classroom is
grounded not in the view that the teacher actually has a free speech
interest in controlling what is taught but rather in a strategic desire to
diffuse power over the educational process and thereby reduce the
danger of monolithic and authoritarian values inculcation by the government. 174 If so, the validity of the theoretical arguments undermining an individual teacher's First Amendment right to curricular
control is irrelevant. Of course, it is easy to imagine specific instances
in which mindless bureaucrats seek to stifle educational creativity by
denying a teacher discretion to teach a particular topic or in a particular manner. But it is important to recall that a teacher's First Amendment right to control her classroom is determined without
considering what the individual teacher wishes to teach. 17 5 The idea
that educational officials could not constrain teachers in making curricular choices could lead to disastrous results. Nevertheless, it is not
feasible to confine the teacher's right only to those situations in which
the teacher is exercising good judgment, because this approach would
effectively replace professional educators with judges as appliers of
this standard.
In rejecting a teacher's First Amendment right to control classroom content, we should emphasize that we are by no means unsympathetic to the constitutionally based concern about concentration of
educational decision-making power in the government. After all, in
Communist educational systems teachers are closely monitored by
their superiors. 176 But the alternative conclusion, that the First
Amendment does not permit local educational officials to impose
meaningful substantive limits upon what teachers may teach, could
lead to such a parade of horribles that it must be rejected, despite its

173
See id. at 1356 (concluding that "teachers' constitutional rights, in and out of the
classroom, do not extend beyond the [F]irst [A]mendment rights of all citizens").
174
See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
175
Therefore, one must establish guiding principles behind a Rawlsian-like "veil of
ignorance." See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
176
In Albania, for example, supervisors approved all lesson plans and then supervised
six to eight hours of classroom instruction per week. THOMAS, supra note 53, at 56. Under
Communism, teachers in Chinese universities were required to formally submit to their
superiors their lesson plans, from which they were not permitted to deviate. See HoUN,
supranote 48, at 75. If the Communist Party questioned the ability of the professor to write
his own lectures, colleagues would prepare them, whereupon the professor was required to
read them verbatim. Id.

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88:62

positive impact on the serious First Amendment problems caused by
177
governmental values inculcation in the educational process.
An alternative procedural model might focus on the need for parental or student involvement in the creation of curriculum as a
means of diluting governmental inculcation power.1 78 Under such an
approach, courts would require school systems to open their curricular processes to parental and student involvement, presumably
through some designated procedure. This model, however, fails to
provide a more satisfactory answer than any of the other approaches.
Although the approach arguably dilutes government's ability to provide a monolithic analysis of value choices, it may cause considerably
more trouble than it is worth. One could easily imagine curricular
chaos developing as a result of including students and parents in the
decision-making process. Moreover, there is no guarantee that parents will disagree with government on key political, moral, or social
issues.
E.

The Preferred Alternative: The Anti-Indoctrination Model

To this point, we have established that (1) allowing government
to inculcate values through the educational process poses a serious
threat to key First Amendment values, and (2) the alternative doctrinal approaches considered to this point fail to avoid those dangers
and give rise to potentially chaotic and harmful judicial interference
in the educational process, or both. However, one alternative does
exist that, although not free of problem or difficulty, significantly
reduces the threats to protected First Amendment interests: the antiindoctrination model.
In fashioning the anti-indoctrination model, we do not advocate
judicial second-guessing of all education officials' pedagogic decisions
that convey-either intentionally or incidentally-particular value
choices to students. Rather, the anti-indoctrination model seeks to
resolve the democratic-educational paradox by recognizing and accepting the logic underlying the concept of judgmental necessity.
177 See Marchi v. Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs., 173 F.3d 469 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that a
special education teacher could not share experiences related to his conversion to Christianity with students); Murray v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Pub. Educ., 919 F. Supp. 838 (W.D. Pa.
1996) (holding that a teacher who was prohibited from conducting classes using a method
called "Learnball," after being told it was an inappropriate teaching method, did not have
her First Amendment rights violated).
178 See Goldstein, supra note 140, at 1356 ("Allowing parents and community groups, as
well as teachers, to have input into educational decisions comports more closely with the
societal desire for lay control of education than does the more autocratic teacher control
theory."); see also Zernike, supra note 127 (quoting a school board member as saying, "Five
or ten years ago, most parents fell into the category of believing my school knows what is
right and best for my child. That trust level has eroded." (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
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When, because of judgmental necessity, a school makes what are on
their face value-neutral educational choices-for example, what subjects to cover, what portions of those subjects to emphasize, or what to
say about those subjects-the anti-indoctrination model would cede to
educators' substantial (though not unlimited) discretion. Thus, the
model begins with the understanding that because schools are naturally unable to teach everything, some agent of the government will
necessarily make choices concerning the content of the curriculum.
In fashioning the anti-indoctrination model, we recognize that value
preferences will inevitably tinge pedagogic decisions, but to completely eradicate all possibility of values inculcation would effectively
reduce to a null set the category of information and opinion that
teachers could constitutionally transmit to students.
Of course, given our position on the dangers to First Amendment
interests caused by in-school values inculcation, 179 in an ideal world
one would be able to separate those situations in which values inculcation is simply the necessary by-product of essential pedagogic choices
from those situations in which government is consciously attempting
to manipulate the educational process in order to instill in students
predetermined socio-political values. For obvious reasons, however,
the drawing of such a constitutionally grounded dichotomy is an impossible goal, both on practical and theoretical levels. Thus, the antiindoctrination approach candidly acknowledges judicial impotence in
the face of educators' exercise of necessary pedagogical discretion
concerning curricular choices. When, however, the inculcation of values is accomplished not as an inherent by-product of pedagogical
choices but rather as a gratuitous effort by school officials to influence
the future political, social, or economic views of their students, the
constitutional limitations imposed by the anti-indoctrination model
would be triggered.
Under the anti-indoctrination approach, an important inquiry
would focus on whether the challenged activity took place within the
confines of the curriculum. Although not everyone agrees that the
curriculum is the most important component of the educational process, 180 it has been the focus of attention for politicians,' 8 ' community
179 See supra Part I.B.
180 See, e.g.,JOHN DEwEY, THE CHILD AND THE CURRICULUM 39 (1902) ("[T]he value of
the formulated wealth of knowledge that makes up the course of study is that it may enable
the educator to determine the environment of the child . . . . Its primary value, its primary
indication, is for the teacher, not for the child."); MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OFJUSTICE 215
(1983) ("The content of the curriculum is probably less important than the human environment within which it is taught.").
181 See, e.g., Clinton's Sustainability CouncilReveals Plans to Control Curriculum,EDUC. REP.,
Dec. 1997, at 1, 1 (stating that an example of the Clinton administration's "plan[ ] to
control public school curriculum" was President Clinton's task force's goal to integrate "a
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activists,18 2 courts, 8 3 legal scholars, 8 4 and many educational theorists.18

5

The simple fact is that the curriculum constitutes the sub-

stance of what schools teach their students. Moreover, it would be
practically and theoretically impossible to completely divorce the substance of the curriculum from all value choices.1 8 6 Both the choice of
what aspects of a subject area to emphasize and what to say about
those particular areas inherently convey certain value choices. To
prohibit schools from conveying values, then, would effectively preclude schools from teaching anything. However, when schools convey
values apart from the teaching of particular subjects, this concern is
no longer present. Therefore, courts conceivably could adopt a First
Amendment standard that turned on whether or not the challenged
transmission of values took place within the confines of the
curriculum. 187

At first glance, this standard seems properly grounded in both
theoretical and pragmatic considerations. On a theoretical level, this
doctrinal dichotomy arguably represents the most reasonable means
of reconciling the democratic-educational paradox. On a pragmatic
level, such a doctrine would seem to have the benefit of ease of applispecific vision of environmental education" in public school curricula (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
182 See, e.g., GADDY ET AL., supra note 22, at 128 (stating that some nonfundamentalist
conservatives reject the teaching of multiculturalist history because they believe it requires
not just tolerance but acceptance of differences in people, and that such acceptance may
destroy a faith in a moral code); PARKER & WEISS, supra note 119, at 18 (arguing that the
reason fundamentalists dislike secular humanism is that it teaches students to think for
themselves).
183 See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988) (stating that
educators can exert greater control over student expression that falls within the curriculum so that students are not exposed to material inappropriate given their level of maturity); Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 869 (1982) (plurality opinion) (distinguishing the
removal of books from the school library from exerting control over the curriculum, an
area in which the school might have "absolute discretion").
184 See, e.g.,
Ryan, supra note 24 (arguing that the Supreme Court has drawn a distinction between the academic or curricular and the social functions of education, and defending such a distinction).
185 See, e.g., Tony Massengale & Peg Michels, Civic Organizing and the Renewal of Public
Education, 64 Soc. EDuc. 53 (2000) (arguing that public education has to start preparing
students to become public citizens rather than merely future workers); Purpel & Ryan,
supra note 102, at 57 (stating that moral education in public schools "should involve careful and sensitive inquiry into moral questions" (emphasis omitted)).
186 See supra Part II.A.
187
See Ryan, supra note 24, at 1340 (arging that "the more a particular policy has to do
with the academic function of schools, the more likely it is that the Court will uphold the
policy, even if it means truncating a constitutional right"). Ryan makes this argument after
examining a wide spectrum of Supreme Court decisions pertaining to public schools, including student speech, Fourth Amendment, and due process cases, as well as cases related
to the Equal Protection Clause, Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, and cases addressing fundamental rights, such as the right to an education and the right to attend
private schools. See id. at 1346-94.
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cation. Closer examination reveals, however, that at least some of the
doctrine's supposed benefits may be illusory. First, one might suggest
that a school's extracurricular activities are as central to its function as
is the curriculum.1 8 8 Second, one might argue that even if one did
accept the theoretical validity of the curricular/non-curricular dichotomy, defining the concept of the curriculum will often be a difficult
task, at least at the margins, thus giving rise to substantial unpredictability and the excessive use of judicial time.
It is possible, however, to fashion responses to both arguments.
As to the former contention, although extracurricular activities may
be as central to a school's function as the curriculum, it is unclear, at
least in the majority of situations, that the transmission of political,
moral, or social values is as fundamentally intertwined with extracurricular activities as it is with the teaching of course work. A school
can, for example, operate sports teams or an art club without necessarily conveying anything except the most abstract value choices. However, the situation may differ if a school operates a newspaper or
sponsors a play. Here, like the curriculum situation, a school is faced
with an important element of judgmental necessity: something has to
be chosen. Thus, although it may be theoretically possible to determine whether a school selected a particular play or an individual
newspaper article as a means of values inculcation, making such an
inquiry would probably give rise to many more problems than it
solved. 189 Accordingly, it would make sense in this context to employ
the same reasoning that led to the adoption of the curricular/noncurricular model in the first place.
The Supreme Court has interpreted curriculum to include most
extracurricular activities. In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, the
Court held that "school-sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive activities that students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur
of the school" are "part of the school curriculum, whether or not they
occur in a traditional classroom setting, so long as they are supervised
by faculty members and designed to impart particular knowledge or
skills to student participants and audiences."19 0 This definition ap188 See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 311 (2000) (discussing extracurricular activities as "part of a complete educational experience").
189 Every choice of a play or newspaper article could be examined ad nauseum in an
effort to determine why the particular choice was made. To appease critics who disliked
the particular message conveyed in an article or play, the school might have to counterbalance its selection with other plays or articles. This could, in return, lead to complaints
from third parties and so on. The whole process would deteriorate into a battle over values
rather than an appreciation of a play or the learning of journalistic techniques.
190 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988). Kuhlmeier concerned a high school principle's decision
to excise two articles-one concerning teen pregnancy and the other the impact of divorce
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pears to go far beyond suggested scholarly definitions of curriculum,
which have focused on "the conveying of information or the teaching
of academic or vocational skills to students by faculty members."' 9 1
It would not necessarily follow, however, that schools should have
complete control over the nature of extracurricular activities. Because of the First Amendment concern over potential values inculcation, under this doctrinal model schools could not establish activities
that were, on their face, inherently tied to a normative position on an
issue of values choice. For example, were a school to establish a "capitalism" club, or a "Young Democrats" club, or even a "racial tolerance"
club, the logic of the anti-indoctrination model would deem these activities unconstitutional. 192
A tougher doctrinal question is posed by extracurricular activities
that do not directly commit to a particular normative position but
whose very existence appears to assume such a position. For example,
junior chamber of commerce activities do not directly deal with the
inculcation of values, but their very existence presumes the validity of
key normative economic assumptions about the value of capitalism.
Arguably, such indirect values inculcation could be deemed even
more insidious to First Amendment interests for the very reason that it
is furtive in nature. Thus, acceptance of our suggested approach
would seem to exclude such activities.
In determining which activities inherently cross the constitutional
line, we may draw a rough analogy to the Establishment Clause jurisprudence. As the Supreme Court has interpreted that Clause, schools
may discuss religious issues; they are, however, prohibited from promoting either particular religions or the idea of religion. 93 By way of
analogy, under the anti-indoctrination model schools could sponsor
debate clubs that debate the issue of abortion; it could not, however,
sponsor an anti-abortion or pro-life club that was established for the
purpose of promoting one side of a political issue. Within certain
confines, however, our model would cede to schools free reign if the
concept ofjudgmental necessity were applicable. In other words, if a
school sponsors a play, it is naturally required to pick something.
Therefore, the First Amendment would not be violated if, for examupon students-from the school newspaper that was produced by students as part of a
journalism class. See id. at 262-63.
191
Ryan, supra note 24, at 1340 n.17.
192 One might well reach a different conclusion, however, concerning a school's neutral support of value-based activities undertaken entirely by students. See Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 839-46 (1995) (holding unconstitutional a
university's denial of funding to a Christian student organization because the funding program was neutral toward religion).
193 See Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394-95
(1993).
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pie, the school were to choose the pro-racial tolerance play, A Raisin
in the Sun, rather than some other play. But if it could be proved that
the school's selections over an extended period unambiguously reveal
a pattern of indirect ideological advocacy, a reviewing court could
find that the school abused its discretion under the judgmental necessity exception.
Under the anti-indoctrination approach, the inculcation of values
could be deemed unconstitutional even within the four corners of the
curriculum if there existed no reasonable relationship between the
particular value or values conveyed and the substance of the course
being taught. For example, if students in a mathematics class are
taught that capitalism is evil, a reviewing court could conceivably conclude that no such reasonable relationship exists. The touchstone for
the model's invocation, then, is whether or not the challenged conveying of values occurs as an inherent element of the educational process. If no reasonable relationship exists between the value conveyed
and the subject taught, the model's rationale for allowing values inculcation disappears.
To be sure, a reviewing court applying the anti-indoctrination
model will inevitably face some difficult fact-based ambiguities. For
example, questions might occasionally arise as to whether the event at
which values are transmitted is properly characterized as part of the
curriculum. In the overwhelming majority of cases, however, the answer to that question will be reasonably clear. Under the anti-indoctrination model, the curriculum consists of the substantive courses
taught to students; it does not include assemblies or activities not officially intertwined with one or more of those courses of study. Thus,
the pedagogical rationale underlying the anti-indoctrination model's
concession to school officials does not apply to school-wide assemblies
at which the value of racial tolerance-or, for that matter, racial intolerance-is conveyed to the students. On the other hand, if the school
teaches a course in the Holocaust, the anti-indoctrination model
would not preclude the direct or indirect transmission of the value of
religious tolerance.' 9 4 The same would be true of a course in the history of race relations. However, if a reviewing court determines that,
despite the school's characterization of the values transmission as part
194
It is conceivable, we suppose, that school officials on occasion could seek to insulate certain values transmissions from constitutional attack by providing them with a sham
curricular label. Such a danger exists in numerous areas of constitutional law, however.
See, e.g., Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 284-87 (1977)
(suggesting that even if the conduct for which the public school teacher was terminated
were constitutionally protected, nevertheless the school board could show by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the same decision despite the protected
conduct). If the party raising the First Amendment argues that the curricular label is
merely a sham, a reviewing court will need to make a factual judgment.
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of a course, the supposed course consists of nothing more than the
transmission of values, then the court may discard the "course" label
195
as a sham.
In addition, factual questions presumably would arise as to
whether or not the challenged value transmission was reasonably related to the substance of the course. Given the necessarily deferential
assumptions underlying the anti-indoctrination model,19 6 a reviewing
court would properly provide school officials with wide latitude on
this question. However, at some point, such as when a teacher instructs students on the evils of capitalism during mathematics class,
the connection becomes so tenuous that values inculcation can no
longer be rationalized as an essential element of the educational
process.
It is likely that the anti-indoctrination model will be equally
troubling to both those who are concerned about values inculcation
in the schools and those who fear judicial interference in the schools.
To those who fear the power of the educational process to engage in
an invidious form of thought control, the anti-indoctrination model
will likely seem impotent in its attempt to police such a serious constitutional danger. Undoubtedly, the model will also raise serious concern for those who fear that the judiciary would effectively sit as a
super school board.
In an important sense, both criticisms are completely accurate.
The anti-indoctrination model gives school officials extremely wide
latitude to fully insulate an intense values-inculcation process from effective judicial review. Yet the model simultaneously contemplates a
significant increase in judicial interference in the educational process.
Indeed, our model would clearly prohibit schools from celebrating
patriotism, promoting the value of tolerance, or warning of the dangers of drugs or tobacco except within the confines of a clearly defined course curriculum, and even then only if such efforts are
substantially related to the course's broader perspective, apart from
the goal of values inculcation. Such an interference with the ability of
school officials to shape students' exposure is by no means
insignificant.
195

See supra note 194. This conclusion does not mean, however, that a school should

be prohibited from teaching a "values" course. The question posed to a reviewing court in
such a case would be whether the course teaches about values, or whether it does nothing
more than convey one particular set of values. In this sense, the issue is virtually identical
to the inquiry a reviewing court must make when applying the First Amendment's Establishment Clause to the content of a school's curriculum.

Under the Constitution the

school may teach about religion; it may not, however, teach religion. See supra note 193
and accompanying text. Therefore, one might find acceptable a survey course about what
different people value, but might find unacceptable a course suggesting that certain values-be they in favor of capitalism or feminism-are inherently superior to other values.
196 See supra Part III.E.
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At the same time, however, the anti-indoctrination model provides school officials with enormous unchecked discretion to transmit
values through the traditional curriculum. Our only defense of this
seemingly over- and underprotective approach is, simply, that there
exists no viable alternative approach that better reconciles the competing elements of the democratic-educational paradox. Put bluntly,
the anti-indoctrination model's only advantage is that it does a better
job at reconciling these concerns than any of the other conceivable
approaches. However, although this is admittedly the model's only
19 7
advantage, it is one that is also dispositive in the model's favor.
IV
APPLYING THE ANTI-INDOCTRINATION MODEL

A.

School Bulletin Boards

Schools commonly promote particular social values to their students by posting material on bulletin boards throughout the school.
Teachers have occasionally raised First Amendment issues in cases in
which they were prohibited from countering the school's message by
posting material promoting their own positions on certain issues.
Though the Supreme Court has never faced this question, the leading
decision in the lower courts is Downs v. Los Angeles Unified School District.198

In Downs, a teacher brought suit against his school district,

challenging school officials' refusal to allow him to post materials on a
bulletin board that reflected an opinion contrary to the one reflected
by material already posted concerning the school's position on Gay
and Lesbian Awareness Month, even though other teachers had
posted material that supported the school district's position. 19 9 The
Ninth Circuit rejected the challenge, reasoning that the school's bul20 0
letin board constituted speech on behalf of the school district.

Therefore, the Ninth Circuit did not require viewpoint neutrality,
even though traditionally the First Amendment demands at least that
197 "No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed, it has been said
that democracy is the worst form of Government except all those other forms that have
been tried from time to time." THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 150 (3d ed. 1979)
(reproducing a portion of Winston Churchill's speech before the House of Commons on
Nov. 11, 1947).
198 228 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2000).
199 See id. at 1005-07. Downs objected to recognition of Gay and Lesbian Awareness
Month at the high school, and therefore created his own bulletin board entitled "Redefining the Family." Id. at 1006. Included among the materials posted was a portion of the

Declaration of Independence, newspaper articles, and antigay and lesbian statements. Id.
at 1006-07.
200
See id. at 1011.
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much of government,2 0 1 because the material posted on the bulletin
boards constituted government speech and was therefore subject to
20 2
total control by the school district.
On a certain level, the court's analysis in Downs makes perfect
sense. Once one recognizes the constitutionality of government
speech, 20 3 there is no point in requiring government to observe viewpoint neutrality in conveying its own viewpoint. Thus, once one acknowledges the authority of government to speak through its schools'
bulletin boards, it follows logically that an individual teacher lacks a
First Amendment right to employ those bulletin boards to express
contrary views. According to the anti-indoctrination model, the constitutional problem occurs not because of an interference with an individual teacher's right to speak, but instead because of an
interference with the recognition of government's authority to em204
ploy the bulletin boards for government speech in the first place.
Our difficulty with the Downs court's analysis, we should emphasize, is not that the court recognized the constitutional validity of the
concept of government speech, though there are scholars who have
found the entire concept to violate the First Amendment. 20 5 It would
be impractical to conclude that in a democratic society, government
may not constitutionally communicate its positions on current issues
to its citizens. The concern, rather, is exclusively with the constitutional validity of government speech in the unique context of the educational system. Under the reasoning of the anti-indoctrination
model, government speech aimed at adults who are capable of judging its merits within the context of the public marketplace of ideas is
completely constitutional, given that private counterspeech is for the
most part readily available. However, government speech in the context of the educational system amounts to a dangerous form of governmental indoctrination that substantially threatens First
Amendment interests. Therefore, government's ability to engage in
this speech is to be tolerated only when to not tolerate it would render
201
See id. (noting that if Downs involved "school-sponsored or imprimatur speech in a
non-public forum," the Court would have to review the school district's actions "through a
viewpoint neutrality microscope").
202 The court stated:
It is not a case involving the risk that a private individual's private speech
might simply '.'bear the imprimatur" of the school or be perceived by
outside individuals as "school-sponsored." Rather than focusing on what
members of the public might perceive Downs's speech to be, in this case we
find it more helpful to focus on who actually was responsible for the speech
on Leichman High's Gay and Lesbian Awareness bulletin boards.
Id.
203
See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
204
See, e.g.,
Buss, supra note 140, at 230 n.105.
205
See, e.g., Kamenshine, supra note 30 (arguing for the recognition of an implied
political establishment clause in the First Amendment).
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performance of the educational function all but impossible. 20 6 The
use of school bulletin boards for the posting of material unrelated to a
class or supervised activity that on its face is value-laden does not seem
to fit within this exception for educational necessity.
Indeed, one could reasonably question why government needs to
have authority to convey its views on current socio-political issues
through the use of school bulletin boards. The only rationale for this
use appears to be the unique strategic advantage of this form of communication in persuading viewers to adopt the normative positions
government advocates, particularly because those viewers possess especially impressionable minds and are exposed to government positions within the confines of an inherently authoritarian framework.
Yet it is exactly that reason that triggers the special concerns of the
anti-indoctrination model; although government may constitutionally
convey its views on current socio-political issues to the public at large,
it may not do so within the confines of the schools apart from the
incidental values inculcation inherently intertwined with the educational process.
B.

Textbook Selections

As a theoretical matter, a school's selection of textbooks should
raise as many First Amendment problems as does a school's selection
of curriculum. Government inculcates value preferences in its stu20 7
dents as much by selecting textbooks as by shaping the curriculum.
This can be particularly troublesome with a subject such as history,
because studies have shown that history textbooks generally minimize
the historical role of dissent. 208 By selecting history texts, a school
ingrains in its students a particular understanding of American history, and the likelihood that they will be exposed to contrary perspectives 20 9 is relatively minimal. Thus, all of the constitutional dangers

created by schools' process of values inculcation are reinforced by
textbook selection.
For the same reason that the First Amendment can play at most
only a minimal role in policing a school's curriculum choices, it can
also be of little use in controlling values inculcation through textbook
selection. As in the case of the curriculum, a school's selection of
textbooks is governed by the principle of judgmental necessity: some
See discussion supra Part III.E.
Frances Fitzgerald has stated that history texts, for instance, are meant "not to explore but to instruct-to tell children what their elders want them to know about their
country." FRANCES FITZGERALD, AMERICA REVISED: HISTORY SCHOOLBOOKS IN THE TWENTI206
207

ETH CENTURY

47 (1979).

See Gottlieb, supra note 157, at 505.
209
For an example of such a contrary perspective on American history, see HOWARD
ZINN, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1999).
208
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books must be chosen over others. For a court to second guess that
choice would inevitably give rise to enormous problems of judicial interference in the exercise of educational discretion.
On the other hand, judicial review of textbook selection would
not be nearly as unwieldy as review of curricular choices. When a
school shapes a curriculum, it makes countless pedagogic choices for
each class. To allow meaningful review of each of those choices would
potentially give rise to prohibitive burdens on the courts and disastrous interference with pedagogic decisions. Textbook choices at
least would not involve the sheer number of pedagogic decisions
made in shaping a course curriculum. Thus, a court arguably could
more willingly question a school's choice of textbook than a school's
shaping of the curriculum. However, it is clear that educators still
must have enormous discretion in making textbook selections.
C.

Teachers' Ideology and Political Activities

One area of the educational process in which the First Amendment has traditionally played a significant role is the penalization of
teachers for expression of their political viewpoints. 2 1 Unlike in the
case of curricular or textbook choices, a particular individual suffers
unique harm when a school system penalizes a teacher for political
expression or activities. Moreover, in that situation a direct prima facie violation of free speech rights has taken place, so a reviewing court
need not invoke a merely prefatory First Amendment concern. 21' Finally, although the Constitution does not guarantee government employment itself, modern First Amendment jurisprudence long ago
abandoned the specious right-privilege distinction as ajustification for
employment deprivations based on the worker's exercise of protected
speech rights. 2 1 2 Therefore, government may no longer justify firings

based on the exercise of the right of expression on the grounds that
the worker had no constitutional right to government employment in
the first place.
Political persecution in the schools played an important and,
many would say, infamous role in American history during the "McCarthy era." During this period, which extended from the late 1940s
to the late 1950s, much of the nation became obsessed with a per210
See, e.g., Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977);
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589

(1967).
211 For examples of prefatory First Amendment concerns, see supra Parts IV.A-B.
212 See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1976); see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, UnconstitutionalConditions,102 HARv. L. REV. 1415, 1444-45 (1989) (citing the National Labor
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1994), for the proposition that it is an unfair labor
practice for an employer to interfere with employees' exercise of their free speech rights.).
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ceived internal threat of subversion from American Communists. 213
In numerous communities, teachers possessing even the remotest connection to Communist activities, as well as those teachers who refused
to sign a loyalty oath, lost theirjobs. 214 In many instances, the courts
upheld such actions by school districts against First Amendment attack. 215 Today, it is probably fair to say, the constitutional conclusion
2 16
would diametrically oppose the result usually reached in the 1950s.

On both political and moral levels, we applaud the judicial move
toward protection of teachers' individual rights of belief and political
association. However, when one seeks to synthesize the individual
teacher's rights with the broader role of public education within the
American constitutional and democratic framework, the modern
trend-at least under certain circumstances-may not make sense. It
is not clear to us that in utilizing the First Amendment as a protection
for teachers' political activities, the Supreme Court has fully considered the logical implications of the democratic-educational paradox.
Depending on which political or constitutional theory underlying the
educational process one chooses to adopt, in some cases the decision
to insulate teachers' outside political activities from school control
may well be inconsistent with the implications of the initial decision to
place the shaping of curriculum in the hands of democratically accountable authorities.
For example, if one begins with the premise that the communitarian-oriented values-enclave approach controls, 217 then it would
make perfect sense for a school to be allowed to pick teachers who will
effectively and enthusiastically convey the values selected by the
school district. Thus, if the school district chooses to convey a message about the values of capitalism, then it would be appropriate to
exclude teachers of civics and history who are unable to convey that
message effectively. By this reasoning, exclusion of Communist teach213 See generally DAVID HALBERSTAM, THE FIFTIES 49-61 (1993) (describing Senator Joseph R. McCarthy and the origins of McCarthyism); ELLEN SCHRECKER, MANY ARE THE
CRIMES: MCCARTHYISM IN AMERICA (1998) (describing the operation and effects of McCarthyism). In actuality, the period both pre- and postdated the time during which Senator McCarthy was the focus of the nation's attention. See SCHRECKER, supra, at x.
214 See Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 591-92; SCHRECKER, supra note 213, at 268-69.
215 See, e.g., Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 493 (1952) ("A teacher works in a
sensitive area in a schoolroom. There he shapes the attitude of young minds towards the
society in which they live. In this, the state has a vital concern.").
216 Though in the early line of cases, mostly taking place in the 1950s, the Court deferred to the states, especially when the Communist Party was implicated, see, e.g., id. at
492-93, the Court has since effectively curtailed state inquiries into an individual's associations without affirmatively declaring that one's private associations were irrelevant for most

public employment positions, see Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 606; see also Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384
U.S. 11, 18-19 (1966) (invalidating as overbroad an Arizona loyalty oath required of all
public employees).
217
See supra Part II.B.
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ers is simply one means of assuring that the chosen normative message is properly transmitted. Similarly, it would be appropriate for a
school district to exclude from a civics or history class a member of
the American Nazi Party or the Ku Klux Klan if the district's chosen
values include racial or religious equality. At the very least, under a
values-enclave approach it would be illogical to recognize the power
of schools today to exclude Nazis or Klansmen from the classroom but
not the power of schools to exclude Communists during the 1950s.
The difference simply concerns the choice of normative values to be
transmitted through the educational process. Surely the question
whether values inculcation violates the First Amendment cannot turn
on whether one agrees or disagrees with the value being conveyed.2 18
The response could be made that although schools may have the
constitutionally valid authority to convey chosen values through the
educational process and may therefore direct their teachers in curriculum decisions, 21 9 it in no way follows that schools may exclude teachers for no other reason than that the teacher's preexisting ideology is
inconsistent with the values selected. As long as the teacher actually
teaches the prescribed material, the argument would proceed, the fact
that the teacher herself may not agree with the content does not automatically imply her inability to convey the message. For example, as
long as the teacher agrees to convey the message of the merits of capitalism, the fact that the teacher is himself a Communist is immaterial.
A school district could reasonably reply, however, that as a practical
matter it is incapable of policing in-class performance, and it must
therefore proceed on the assumption that a Communist teacher could
not effectively transmit a political value message so diametrically opposed to the teacher's fundamental political views. The same reasoning would apply to a Klansman who claimed that, despite his views on
racial equality, he could nevertheless effectively transmit the school's
message of racial harmony.
It should be emphasized, however, that even under a values-enclave model a school district should not be permitted to exclude Communist teachers from all classrooms. Presumably, no value
inconsistent with Communist ideology is conveyed in a science or
mathematics class. To permit a school district to exclude Communists
from such classes, then, would amount to naked punishment for the
holding of unpopular political viewpoints-clearly a constitutionally
unacceptable result. Thus, the goal for a reviewing court would be to
distinguish ideologically grounded exclusions, designed to facilitate a
school's ability to transmit its chosen values, from such exclusions intended solely to punish the holding of unpopular political views.
218
219

See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.B.
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Though we reject the values-enclave model as a proper application of First Amendment principles, 22 ° it is probable that the same
conclusion would be reached even under the anti-indoctrination
model. Recall that under that model, school systems are given signifi22 1
cant discretion to shape the substance of the educational process.
This is not because we approve of a school district's ability to transmit
certain preordained values to its students, as is the case under the
values-enclave model. Rather, it is because we openly concede an inability to fashion a means of policing the values-inculcation process
inherent in the educational process without simultaneously undermining the school's ability to teach the substance of the curriculum.
Courts must concede to educators the power to choose how and what
to teach. In light of this important concession, it would be unreasonable to prevent a school district from excluding Communists, Nazis, or
racists from classes in which information or opinion contrary to their
ideologies is to be taught. Educational officials who do not believe in
a Marxist version of American history, for example, should have the
power, consistent with the First Amendment, not to hire a Marxist to
teach the American history class, for no reason other than that she is a
Marxist.
Admittedly, our conclusion may at first appear counterintuitive to
anyone who is protective of the First Amendment right of free expression. But either because of political philosophy (as under the valuesenclave model) or recognition of practical realities (under the antiindoctrination model), the content of a public school's curriculum is,
for the most part, properly viewed as a form of government speech.
An individual, for the most part, possesses a First Amendment right
not to be punished by government for holding unpopular political
views. However, it does not follow that she possesses a First Amendment right to serve as a governmental spokesperson, chosen for the
purpose of conveying a governmentally selected message.
CONCLUSION

Ironically, just as this Article shapes its analysis in response to a
paradox, so too is our suggested approach arguably vulnerable to paradoxical lines of criticism. From a certain perspective, one conceivably could challenge our conclusion that government's ability to shape
the content of the educational process gives rise to a serious problem
for the First Amendment right of free expression. After all, in prescribing the content of the education of the nation's youth, government in no way directly denies adult citizens the right to speak in a
220

221

See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
See supra Part III.E.
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public forum. Hence, it could be argued that the entire First Amendment problem to which we attempt to fashion a constitutional response is completely illusory. From a wholly opposite perspective,
however, our analysis is paradoxically susceptible to criticism for inadequately responding to the serious First Amendment problem that we
have noted. Though seemingly deriving from opposite perspectives,
the two lines of criticism share some important similarities: although
both appear to have superficial appeal, they lose much of their force
once the broader practical and constitutional contexts are recognized.
On a purely formalistic level, it is true that government's ability to
shape the content of the educational process does not technically invade an adult individual's ability to speak in a public forum or unrestricted environment. We believe, however, that it would myopically
place form over substance to ignore the potentially ominous implications of government control over education on the meaningful exercise of free speech rights. As experience with totalitarian regimes has
traditionally demonstrated, government's power to shape the minds
of its youth through the inherently authoritarian educational process
provides a foundational element of the broader power of thought
control that is so essential to a totalitarian government's ability to effectuate its hold over society. 2 22 Allowing supposedly free citizens to

exercise the right of free expression when the government has effectively destroyed their ability to question and reason provides a rather
hollow guarantee of free expression. Thus, it is both necessary and
appropriate to insert the judicial review process at a preliminary stage
in order to insure preservation of the substance of the free speech
right.
One might respond that the dangers of totalitarian influence to
which we point amount to a straw man, because the reality is that
American society is far different from the totalitarian societies that we
fear. To a certain extent, the point is a legitimate one. Despite governmental control of the educational process, the American democratic tradition has assured the right of dissent far more effectively
than any totalitarian society even purports to do. It would defy reality,
however, to assume that the right to dissent from widely shared public
values has been uniformly preserved throughout American history.
Indeed, from the Alien and Sedition Acts to the suppression of dissent
during the Civil War to the compelled patriotism of the World War I
period to the Red Scares of both post-world war periods, the United
States has often refused to tolerate substantial dissent from widely

222

See supra Part I.B.
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held political views. 223 Can one definitively assert that any or all of
these periods of political and ideological suppression were caused, in
whole or in part, by the ideological conformity induced by governmental control of the educational process? No. But at least as an intuitive matter, such an inferential leap seems sufficiently reasonable to
justify the need for constitutionally protective measures.
The criticism that our suggested solution fails to solve this problem is partially true. But that is exactly the point: it is only partially
true. We readily concede that much of the potentially harmful indoctrination occurs in the shaping of the curriculum, and that our antiindoctrination model is powerless to prevent that result except in the
most blatant or extreme cases. It does not necessarily follow, however,
that our model would be completely impotent in preventing improper
values inculcation in the schools. Certainly, a not insignificant portion of the dangerous values inculcation takes place outside the context of the actual educational function, through school-sponsored
assemblies, bulletin boards, distribution of advocacy material, and use
of the Pledge of Allegiance. Indeed, values inculcation through these
processes is in some sense more dangerous than more-indirect, curricular-based indoctrination, for the very reason that it is unadorned by
surrounding educational content. Thus, government officials intent
on indoctrination may employ these extra-educational processes more
freely and easily than they can through the more complex processes
of selecting textbooks and the shaping of course content. When the
dust settles, perhaps one predicts that at most the anti-indoctrination
model could prevent fifteen to twenty percent of the improper values
inculcation that occurs within America's school systems. But a reduction of fifteen to twenty percent is, after all, a significant reduction in
the threat to First Amendment rights.
Perhaps equally important are the social and political benefits
that could derive from exposing the indoctrination dangers inherent
in the shaping of the school curriculum, a reality generally hidden
from public view. Thus, though judicial adoption of the anti-indoctrination model will not by itself cure the serious constitutional problem,
the public exposure that would inevitably accompany the Court's
adoption of the anti-indoctrination model may do much to put members of the public on guard against undue curricular-based indoctrination. As respected constitutional scholars have long noted, the
Supreme Court is engaged in an ongoing moral dialogue with the

See, e.g., SAMUEL A. STOUFFER, COMMUNISM, CONFORMITY, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES: A
13-14 (1955); Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the FirstAmendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 456 (1985).
223

CROSS-SECTION OF THE NATION SPEAKS ITS MIND
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public.2 2 4 Thus, the Court's formal adoption of the anti-indoctrination model, accompanied by a clear articulation of the indirect, but
nevertheless very real, constitutional dangers to which governmental
control of the educational process inevitably gives rise, could play an
extremely valuable role in awakening interested citizens to those
dangers.
There remains for discussion the final line of criticism, namely
that the anti-indoctrination model constitutes a dramatic disruption
of the educators' realm of expertise by the judiciary. This criticism is
in a certain sense ironic, because we developed the anti-indoctrination model to a large extent for the very purpose of assuring the preservation of educators' authority in the most fundamental aspects of
the educational process. Thus, the model substantially preserves governmental authority to fashion the substance of the curriculum and to
shape the contours of many extracurricular activities that are framed
in a facially value-neutral fashion. The simple response to this criticism, then, is that to the extent the anti-indoctrination model does
interfere with educational discretion, it does so solely in areas in
which the exercise of such discretion would give rise to an unacceptable threat to the meaningful exercise of First Amendment rights.
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